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Abstract  
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Supervisor Sara Lundqvist 
Course BUSP70 Degree Project in Finance, 30 ECTS 
Authors Mikael Karlsson and Stine Kamilla Lerstad Langaas 
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Summary This paper investigates if a relationship exists between women in TMTs and 
firm performance for 187 Large- and Mid-Cap firms in Scandinavia for the 
period 2009-2013. Thereby adding to the scarce international evidence within 
the gender diversity in TMTs literature. The theoretical simultaneous 
relationship between performance and gender diversity in TMTs is taken into 
account and a 2SLS approach is applied. In general, the results from the 2SLS 
indicate that the inclusion of women in TMTs, as measured by four diversity 
measures, has a significant impact on firm performance as measured by 
Tobin’s Q - while having no impact on performance as measured by ROA. 
Considering the weakness of the instruments employed, panel techniques are 
also estimated and find no significant effects.  
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1. Introduction 
Past decades has experienced considerable progress in regard to gender equality, and women 
have made advancements into domains historically dominated by men. However, despite 
becoming more common in the upper levels of regulatory, political and corporate settings – 
women are still underrepresented in leadership positions. In 2015, a mere 22% of senior 
leadership roles were held by women globally, a proportion that has barely changed over the 
past decade (Grant Thornton, 2015). Research on different characteristics and dynamics of the 
"upper echelon" teams and its connection toward the organizational output has also made 
progress since its inception over 30 years ago (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Generally, the 
research has focused on demographic and heterogeneity aspects of teams in leadership 
positions, but the research into gender diversity is relatively scarce as noted by amongst 
others Francoeur et. al. (2008) and Dezö and Ross (2012). Additionally, most of the available 
evidence in regard to gender diversity in the "upper echelon theory" framework relates to 
Non-Executive Directors (NED), and are dominated by research into the U.S. market (ex. 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Erhardt et. al., 2003), 
although some international evidence exist: UK (Haslam et. al., 2010; McCann and Wheeler, 
2011), Romania (Vintila et. al., 2008), Scandinavia (Randøy et. al., 2006) and Denmark 
(Rose, 2007; Smith et. al., 2006). NEDs are an organization’s principal control device, since 
they seek to monitor and deter management from enhancing their own interests (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). It is however, the executive managers, the top management team (TMT) who 
run the day-to-day business. 
 
Carpenter et. al. (2004) note that a firm’s behavior and performance to a large extent is the 
product of the TMT, which after all are in charge of strategic and organizational decisions. 
Research into TMTs is a younger phenomenon in the "upper echelon" framework, yet again 
dominated by North American studies (ex. Krishnan and Park (2005); Lee and James (2007) 
with scarce international evidence. Moreover, TMT related papers are often concerned with 
more general TMT diversity (ex. Carpenter (2002); Bär et. al. (2009); Nielsen and Nielsen 
(2013); Zhang (2007)). The rarer inclusion of gender diversity in TMTs has provided mixed 
results. Some find a positive relationship towards female members of the TMT (Catalyst 
(2004); Krishnan and Park (2005); Dezö and Ross (2012); Francoeur et. al (2008)) whilst 
others find negative (Lee and James (2007); Bär et. al. (2009); Darmadi (2013)). Although 
mixed, four out of the seven papers indicate that gender diversity has a positive effect on 
performance, which makes us question the male dominance in TMTs. Obviously, multiple 
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factors regarding the context and dynamics of how the TMT functions will vary across 
countries (Glunk et al., 2001). We will therefore add the Scandinavian context to the lacking 
international evidence.  
 
Scandinavian culture is seemingly characterized by egalitarian values. From a corporate view, 
the inclusion of women in boardrooms enhances the belief that women are most welcome to 
address top positions. After all, Norway was the first country in the world to implement 
gender quotation for boards in 2003. The Swedish government encourages gender diversity 
via guidelines (Svensk Kod för Bolagsstyrning) and Denmark followed through with a similar 
regulation two years ago. Further, compared to the European region, Scandinavia find itself 
well above average for many areas concerning gender diversity. Considering the Glass 
Ceiling Index (Econonomist, 2015), scoring the best countries to be "a working woman" 
based on factors like wage, education, employment etc., we find further support the notion of 
Scandinavia as a progressive region in regards to gender equality. However, Scandinavian 
TMTs have not yet entered into the “gender balance zone”, the case where women constitute 
between 40-60% of the team (European Commission, 2013). 
 
This study investigates whether the inclusion of women in TMTs has any implications on 
Scandinavian firm performance, and contributes to the literature in four ways. First of all, to 
the authors knowledge this study is the first of its kind for the Scandinavian region; Secondly, 
multiple gender diversity variables are employed to determine if there is a relationship 
between women in TMTs and firm performance; Thirdly we evaluate whether the markets 
seem to undervalue firms with women in their TMT in line with the findings of Haslam et. al 
(2010); and Finally the theoretically likely simultaneous relationship between women in 
TMT’s and performance is taken into account. 
 
…………………. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two presents existing literature 
and theories on TMT diversity and women in leadership positions. Section three describes the 
data and methods. Section four reports the results and analysis. Section five discusses 
implications of the employed methods while conclusion and suggestions for further research 
are presented in section six.  
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2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
The following section summarizes the relevant literature (Appendix A.1 gives a brief 
overview) and theories. Firstly, theories on women in leadership is presented. Secondly, TMT 
diversity literature is reviewed. Thirdly, some evidence from NED studies are 
presented.  Lastly, our hypothesis’ are introduced. 
2.1 Women in Leadership Positions 
Drawing from the situation described in the introduction, the fact that women are 
underrepresented in TMTs is prevalent. In general, there is a broad consensus that there is an 
existing barrier, an invisible glass ceiling, preventing women to break through to become 
members of this elite group (Cotter et. al., 2001). Token status theory suggests that women 
may be included in TMTs only to fulfill expectations of diversity. As a result the best 
individual is not necessarily chosen which would support a negative evaluation bias towards 
female leaders (Kanter, 1977).  
 
Gender stereotyping is an issue affecting our perceptions of female performance in top 
positions. Lee and James (2007) finds evidence that investors in the U.S reacts negatively 
towards the appointment of women to CEO positions. This, they note, has a strong relation 
towards gender stereotyping. Kanter (1977) explains that people tend to use their perception 
of femininity to distort their expectation when evaluating female members of a TMT, which is 
a problem since it is not consistent with leadership roles. Some typical feminine 
characteristics are for example being emotional, sensitive or whiny (Catalyst, 2005). 
However, research aiming to describe female leadership styles do not support the notion that 
these characteristics influence leadership attributes. For example, Johansen (2007) found 
women to employ a different set of strategies than men, basically by paying more attention to 
the process than the outcome, and in turn found to have a positive relationship towards 
performance. Reviewing psychological literature Barber and Odean (2001) conclude that men 
are more likely to be overconfident than women. Drawing on this, Rau (2014) investigate 
whether women are more risk averse traders and finds that women realize less capital losses. 
Further, women are perceived as better managers during periods of crises since they possess 
better interpersonal skills, and more willingly accept the blame for failures, compared to men 
(Ryan et. al., 2011).  
 
 6 
The glass cliff theorem, a phenomenon observed by Ryan and Haslam (2005), indicates that 
women are appointed to top positions directly following a crisis and thus becomes 
overrepresented in poorly performing firms. A contradictory study of women promoted to 
CEOs in Fortune 500 companies, finds no evidence of women being more likely to be 
appointed to top positions in struggling firms (Cook and Glass, 2014). However, they see a 
relationship between overcoming the barrier of female appointments to TMTs as a product of 
diversity in decision making mechanisms. In an all-male or male dominated decision making 
mechanism it is harder for women to break through, since male individuals are more likely to 
appoint members that are similar to themselves (Daily and Dalton, 1995), a phenomenon 
Kanter (1977) named homosocial reproduction. Since male decision makers generally are 
dominant in companies - men will be chosen to top positions. Supporting this view is both; 
Bruckmüller and Branscombe (2010) who suggest that the class cliff is more prevalent in 
companies with few women in the upper echelons, and; Cook and Glass (2014) who support 
that the proportion of women in the decision making bodies, have a larger impact on female 
appointments than firm performance. In their sample of Danish listed firms, Smith et. al 
(2006) find that there are more women in TMTs of companies with a more feminine 
character, for example the retail sector. Arbitidi et. al. (2003) compare competency of female 
managers in the "masculine" industry sector in Sweden, and conclude that there does not 
seem to exist any overall significant differences in regards to competency. 
2.2 TMT diversity 
Since the 1980’s a growing issue of interest among researchers within the corporate strategy 
field has been the "upper echelon" theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), which suggest that 
managers view situations through their own personalized lenses. Unique experiences in life 
will affect how they are coping with managerial decision making, and performance outcome 
is determined by the groups - not the individual's - overall knowledge and efforts. 
Theoretically, there exist a common trade-off for the implications of a diversified TMT. 
Amongst others, Homberg and Bui (2013) emphasize two perspectives; (i) the information-
decision-making-perspective, which imply better decision making through a broader scope of 
information due to the demographic diversity of a heterogeneous TMT, and (ii) similarity-
attraction-perspective, which enhance the benefits of homogeneous TMTs, since the 
uncertainty of the unfamiliar personal bonds are mitigated and eliminate fear and stress 
related towards such feelings.  
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Existing TMT literature has been predominantly focused on the more general diversity aspect 
of TMTs (ex. Glunk et. al., 2001; Zhang, 2007; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2013). These diversity 
measures are typically some or many demographical features, such as age, education, tenure, 
nationality etc. Carpenter (2002), for example, finds a positive relationship between TMTs 
educational, functional and tenure heterogeneity on performance, assuming that 
organizational complexity is taken into account. Bär et. al. (2009) finds informational 
diversity (industry tenure and education) to have a positive impact on mutual fund team 
performance while social diversity (gender and age) influences performance negatively by 
increasing conflicts. They make no distinction in favour of any gender, but argue that, ceteris 
paribus, gender heterogenous teams perform worse than homogenous ones. 
 
The few studies focusing solely on gender diversity in TMTs present contradictory 
conclusions. Investigating reactions to CEO appointments in the U.S, Lee and James (2007) 
notice more negative reactions towards female appointees compared to those of men. 
However, the reactions are smaller if it concerns women joining the TMT through another top 
position, and even less noticeable if she is hired from within the company. Contradictory 
findings are presented by Catalyst (2004) which assert that, using a sample of 353 Fortune 
500 companies, the upper quartile regarding gender ratios in TMTs outperform the lower 
quartiles, using ROE and raw stock returns as their performance measures. Also Krishnan and 
Park (2005) see a positive relationship towards the proportion of women and organizational 
performance on Fortune 1000 firms. Additionally, they stress the fact that the inclusion of 
women in TMTs not necessarily result in better performance. Instead, they argue that firms 
who appoint women to their TMTs are more successful following the fact that they promote 
based on merit. Looking into whether women in TMTs improve task performance, Dezö and 
Ross (2012) argue that there are informational and social diversity benefits related to having 
female members. However, they are only able to show that this is improving task performance 
in companies with a strong focus on innovation in their strategy. International evidence is 
provided by Darmadi (2013) who finds that women affect performance negatively in 
Indonesia. 
2.3 Literature regarding NEDs 
The literature on gender diversity among NEDs finds contradictory results as well. On the one 
hand, Haslam et. al. (2010) found that companies with all male boards on the FTSE 100 enjoy 
a 37% subjective valuation premium. As measure by comparing the accounting based 
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measures ROA and ROE towards Tobin’s Q. A less extreme case is McCann and Wheeler 
(2011), who also explores the business case of having women on boards in FTSE 100 firms, 
but find no significant difference in board characteristics. Thereby, they find no evidence for 
women resulting in changed performance, one way or another. Lastly, some find positive 
effects of female members. Vintila et. al. (2008) examined the percentage of women on 
boards on the Bucharest stock exchange, aiming to see whether it positively influence 
performance. They find that the percentage of women need to be at least 22,5% to positively 
influences the industry adjusted Tobin’s Q. Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) found board 
gender diversity, as measured by two heterogeneity indexes, to have a positive effect on firm 
value and the opposite causal relationship to be insignificant. In their research into U.S firms 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) see an average negative effect of gender diversity on the board in 
relation to company performance, and suggest that mandating female quotations can destroy 
value for well-governed firms. Erhardt et. al. (2008) however, enhances the positive effects of 
having a diverse board, suggesting that this is a way to improve financial performance. The 
study of Francoeur et. al (2008) focus more on the risk profiles of the companies, and suggest 
that gender diversity, both regarding TMTs and NEDs, will improve performance when the 
company operates in a complex environment.  
 
For the Scandinavian region, Rose (2007) and Smith et. al. (2006) provides Danish evidence. 
Rose (2007) find no relationship between the proportion of women on boards and 
performance, while Smith et. al. (2006) finds that the women appearing on boards are 
extremely qualified individuals, and that this is strongly correlated to an observed improved 
performance. Including a larger spectrum of diversity measures, Randøy et. al. (2006) find no 
significant effect of age, gender and national diversity on boards of the 500 largest 
Scandinavian companies. 
2.4 Hypothesis  
In line with existing research, constituting mixed findings on the relationship between women 
in TMTs and performance, we postulate our first hypothesis:  
H1: Women in Top Management Teams in Scandinavia have a significant effect on firm 
performance. 
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Furthermore, following the interesting distinction made by Haslam. et. al. (2010), we consider 
the possibility of a similar investor bias for the Scandinavian region and postulate our second 
hypothesis;   
H2: There exists an investor bias in Scandinavia which affects the subjective performance, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. 
3. Data and Methodology 
The following section describes the data, variables and methods employed to analyze the 
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance in Scandinavia. Measures of 
TMT diversity are gathered manually from annual reports and the internet, while financial 
data is gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Tests and regressions are run in 
EViews.8. 
3.1 Sample Data 
The data consists of Mid and Large Cap firms from Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
(Scandinavia) for the period 2009 – 2013. The firms were selected via the built in "criteria 
search" in Thomson Reuters Database so that only firms defined as belonging to one of the 
Scandinavian countries and having at least one equity on its national market were included in 
the sample. Financial and firm specific variables as well as industry classification (ICB) codes 
were collected from the database for the selected firms. The remainder of the data, TMT 
specific variables, was gathered by hand from annual reports. When necessary, and possible, 
information was complemented via web searches. Excluding firms with broken fiscal year 
(fiscal year not congruent with calendar year) and those with essential missing variables. For 
example, a number of firms hold no information regarding their TMT except the CEO. Our 
final sample consists of 187 firms, a total of 935 observations, and is summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: Distribution of Companies in the Sample 
 
Total Large-Cap Mid-Cap 
Sweden 98 56 42 
Denmark 32 14 18 
Norway 57 20 37 
Total 187 90 97 
Source: Compiled by authors. The table summarizes the amount of companies in 
the sample distinguishing between country and size (Large-/Mid-Cap) 
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Removing Small Cap firms can have several implications on the final results and it is possible 
that the relationship we are searching for between women in TMT and firm performance is 
more prevalent in smaller firms. However, we expect the information portrayed in the annual 
reports regarding the TMTs characteristics to be richer for larger firms. This suggestion seems 
to be supported considering the results of our data gathering process, where the finally 
included Mid-Cap firms generally contain less observations regarding informational diversity 
compared to their Large-Cap counterparts (Appendix A.2). Also, we believed it to be more 
likely to find additional and complementing information on the web for managers of larger 
firms. Finally, similar studies from the U.S. apply data from the S&P500, Fortune 1000 and 
similar, for comparative purposes we thereby need the larger firms from Scandinavia.  
3.2 Dependent Variables 
We employ two different performance measures in our study. Firstly, we employ the 
accounting-based performance measure Return on Assets (ROA), defined as the ratio between 
the firm's net income in relation to the book value of assets (Erhardt et. al., 2003). Secondly, 
we employ the market based performance measure Tobin’s Q (TQ). As of late, accounting 
based measures are not viewed all too favorably in the literature. Albeit being considered 
measures of current year’s performance, it has been criticized for being backward looking and 
subject to biased calculations (ex. earnings management) and the interpretation of accounting 
regulations (Dezö and Ross, 2012). In contrast, Tobin’s Q takes the markets future 
expectations of the firm’s performance into account by comparing the firm’s market value 
with the replacement value of its assets. However, Tobin’s Q is not without criticism. Most 
obvious is the fact that Tobin’s Q is an approximation and thereby highly dependent on how it 
is defined. It should also be mentioned that, since it in the end is dependent on stock-based 
performance, Tobin’s Q will be influenced by market perceptions and sentiment, which in 
turn may be well-beyond the actual control of the firm (Haslam et al, 2010). There are 
multiple approaches used to approximate Tobin’s Q in the literature, for example Vintila et.al. 
(2014) employ an industry adjusted estimate, while Adams et. al. (2009) defines it as the ratio 
of the firm's market value over its book value of assets. In this study we employ the definition 
used by Rose (2007) and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), where Tobin’s Q is the sum of 
the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total 
assets. In the eye of an investor, a firm with TQ larger than one is seen as efficiently 
employing available resources and subsequently creating value while the opposite holds for 
those with Q below one. To reduce skewness, TQ is included in its natural logarithmic form. 
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For the reasons mentioned above, Tobin’s Q has become the predominant performance 
measure in more recent literature, however employing both measures is not uncommon, as 
exemplified by amongst others Dezö and Ross (2012), Adams and Ferreira (2009) and 
Darmadi (2013). Haslam et. al. (2010) makes a distinction between the measures, categorizing 
ROA as an "objective" measure of firm performance while Tobin’s Q is considered 
"subjective". This distinction comes from their review into the differences in results presented 
in the glass cliff literature. Despite agreeing with the literature that parts of the differences in 
results comes from the fact that the studies are performed in different countries, as well as 
affected by different other factors. They withhold that one important distinction that the 
literature misses, is the fact that the glass cliff phenomenon arises from prejudice (socio-
psychological factors) rather than economic factors. Thereby, if the glass cliff phenomenon 
holds, an investor would take the hiring of a woman into top positions in the firm as an 
indication of "bad times" and believe the firm to be in financial trouble, and hence adjust their 
market expectations. Interested in whether any prejudice exists in the Scandinavian market, 
we make the same general distinction and consider TQ as a subjective measure that account 
for possible investor bias.  
3.3 Explanatory Variables 
Our explanatory variables measures gender diversity in the TMT and constitutes of three 
different categories – a dummy variable, the ratio of women in TMTs and two gender 
diversity indexes. Women were identified via the combination of name and picture in the 
annual reports, and internet searches were employed if necessary. The authors believe 
themselves to be well-versed in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon names, which constitute the 
overwhelming majority of TMT members in the sample, and thereby believe the number of 
women in the sample to be correctly specified. However, the risk of having incorrectly 
specified individuals exists, since gender is never explicitly specified in annual reports, which 
will always be a potential problem for this kind of studies. 
 
Generally the TMTs in the literature seem to be defined as the top two tiers of executive 
officers within a firm, and thereby captures all officers at the vice-president level and above 
(Carpenter, 2002; Zhang, 2007) while Catalyst (2004) define it as those corporate officers 
who have day-to-day responsibility for corporate operations, power to legally bind the firm 
and represent the firm on major decisions. However, since titles change, may be firm specific 
and at times difficult to place in a hierarchal sense, we employ the definition used in Nielsen 
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and Nielsen (2013), who define the TMT as the executive team presented in the annual report. 
This is a readily available and straightforward categorization which holds the added benefit 
that the firm themselves define who constitute the executive management team. The average 
TMT size in our sample consists of 7,2 persons, which probably indicate a somewhat more 
inclusive definition than the U.S. literature with an average around 5,9 (Dezö and Ross, 
2012), Indonesia with average 4,5 (Darmadi, 2013)  and China 5,8 (Zhang, 2007). However, 
lacking comparable Scandinavian evidence, we cannot exclude that the difference is purely 
due to cultural factors.  
 
Firstly, we employ a simple dichotomous variable (WTMT) which takes the value one if there 
are one or more women in the TMT and zero otherwise. This variable makes it possible to 
suggest whether the mere presence of women seem to have any significant effect on 
performance. Secondly, we employ the ratio of women in the TMT in relation to team size 
(PWTMT) enabling tests on whether a higher (lower) percentage of women in TMT results in 
better (worse) performance. Finally, we employ two different estimates for gender diversity 
which takes into account the social groups in the TMT (female/male) as well as the 
distribution of members between them; 
 
i) Blau index (BLAU) as employed by Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), where gender 
diversity is given by; 
 
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Where 𝑖 = 2 represents the two categories; female and male. Pi represent the proportion of 
team members belonging to category 𝑖 . The Blau index thereby ranges between zero 
representing no diversity and a maximum value of 0,5 when there is an equal number in each 
category. 
 
ii) Teachman entropy-based index (TEACH) employed by Bär et al. (2007) where gender 
diversity is given by; 
 
 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = ∑ −𝑃𝑖 ∗ ln (𝑃𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
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Denotations are interpreted as in Blau and cases of no diversity results in the value of zero, 
while the maximum value (equal numbers in each category) has increased to 0,69. Essentially, 
the only difference between the variables is that Teachman is more sensitive toward small 
changes in diversity (Baumgärtner, 2006) 
3.4 Control Variables  
Following the upper echelons theory a firm's behavior and performance should be linked 
toward how well the TMT functions. Bär et al. (2007) found informational diversity to have a 
positive impact, while social diversity (gender) had a negative impact, on team performance 
in the mutual funds industry. Dezö and Ross (2012) argue that more heterogeneous groups 
should result in higher quality decisions due to different knowledge and points of view within 
the team. Social diversity is to an extent already covered by the explanatory variable, but we 
add the proportion of foreigners (non-nationals) in TMT (PFOR) as an additional measure 
(Rose, 2007). We include informational diversity by including a measure for TMT tenure 
(VAR_TEN) as well as formal education (VAR_EDU). Tenure diversity is captured by the 
variation in TMT tenure among members of the team, where we consider a low variation in 
TMT tenure as an indication of shared experiences and knowledge regarding the firm and 
how to efficiently communicate within the TMT. This facilitates decision making and 
subsequently firm performance (Zhang, 2007). Educational background heterogeneity is 
captured by the variation in formal education within the TMT where the highest academic 
degree achieved by an individual manager within the TMT is transformed into years of formal 
education. A master’s degree is thereby transformed into five years, a Bachelor degree three 
years and so forth (Bär et al., 2007). 
 
Additionally we employ a broad set of firm specific control variables used in the TMT 
literature; (i) a dummy variable for firms with all male boards (MBOARD) are included to 
control for the potential of a positive "subjective" valuation premium as found by Haslam 
et.al. (2010); (ii) leverage (LEV) as measured by the ratio between total debt and total assets 
and (iii) firm size as measured by the total assets (SIZE) - probably the two most common 
control variables from the literature (ex. Dezö and Ross, 2012; Darmadi, 2013; Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera, 2008); (iv) Growth in sales (SALESG) as measured by the relative increase in 
sales compared to previous year (Vintila et. al., 2014); and additionally two variables 
employed by Dezö and Ross (2012) -  (v) a measure for the age of capital stock (AGECAP) 
which, since the remaining useful life of an asset should be larger in relation to depreciation 
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expense, can be indirectly defined as the depreciation expense in relation to net property, 
plant and equipment and (vi) the intensity of capital expenditure (CAPEX_INT) defined as the 
previous year’s capital expenditures in relation to assets. 
 
Subsequently, the employed control variables can be divided into three categories; social 
diversity, informational diversity and firm characteristic variables. However, there are some 
clear restrictions in the data employed which forces us to adapt. Generally, the financial data 
gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream, and employed as firm specific control variables 
(except age of capital stocks), covers the majority of the observations included in our sample. 
This is however not the case for the manually gathered variables for social and informational 
diversity, where around 64% of VAR_EDU and 67% VAR_TEN for the included 
observations could be calculated using the information from annual reports and the internet. If 
all CV included, in a multivariate context, we would have to base our regression on 422 
observations. We therefore split the estimations into two models; Model 1 which include all   
firm specific variables (except age of capital stock) and Model 2 which includes all control 
variables. To reduce skewness; sales growth, capital expenditure intensity, size and age of 
capital stock are used in their natural logarithm form. 
3.5 Endogeneity and Reverse Causal Effects 
Endogeneity is pervasive and essentially an unavoidable problem in corporate finance 
research. It arises when the error terms is correlated with the explanatory variable, thereby 
violating the fourth OLS assumption (e.g. 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑢) = 0 ), and is the primary cause of 
inference problems (Roberts and Whited, 2013).  There are three sources of endogeneity; (i) 
Omitted variables (OV), referring to the fact that explanatory variables are excluded from the 
regression model due to various reasons; (ii) Measurement Error (ME) following the fact that 
most variables in corporate finance literature is difficult to quantify, or unobservable, creating 
the need for approximations; and (iii) Simultaneity, following the fact that in some cases 
dependent variable and explanatory variable(s) are determined in equilibrium, so that it can be 
argued that y causes x and vice versa - consequently raising concerns of reverse causality 
(Roberts and Whited, 2013). Concerning the literature on gender diversity in relation to firm 
performance, both Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) and Dezö and Ross (2012) note that a 
reverse causal relationship could exist between gender diversity in TMTs and firm 
performance, and that such a relationship is rarely articulated in the literature. This 
relationship arises from the fact that successful firms, having the necessary excess resources, 
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are more likely to strive towards the aspirational norm of gender diversity (Dezö and Ross, 
2012). Hence, the positive relationship found between women in TMTs and performance, in 
for example Catalyst (2004) and Krishnan and Park (2005), could possibly be driven by this 
reverse causality and subsequently the result of biased inference.  
 
Considering the potential existence of simultaneity bias for the relationship in question, we 
rely on exogenous variation from an instrumental variable (IV) to account for the problem, 
and apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. However, being aware that such a 
relationship might not exist
1
 we will also apply panel techniques. It is however likely that we 
have OV bias, since for example the ability of the executive managers in question is 
unobservable and thereby omitted from our models. This type of endogeneity can be 
controlled for using fixed and random effects.  
3.6 Model Specification 
To control for the effect of women in TMTs on performance we estimate multivariate 
regression models for unbalanced panel data. As mentioned in section 3.2 we split the control 
variables into two categories based on the number of observations available, resulting in two 
model specifications. Each model will thereby be run eight times (2x4) specifying the model 
once for each performance measure in combination with each one of the explanatory 
variables. 
 
Model 1:  PERF𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑉1𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
Model 2: PERF𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑉1𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑉2𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
Where PERF denominates the two measures of performance employed, ROA and Tobin’s Q; 
WOMAN denotes each of the four different measures for gender diversity in the TMT 
(DWOM, PWOM, BLAU and TEACH); CV1 are firm specific control variables (SIZE, LEV, 
LN_SALESG, LN_CAPEX_INT and MBOARD); CV2 are control variables for TMT diversity 
and one firm specific variable (LN_AGECAP, PFOR, VAR_TEN and VAR_EDU); and finally 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  denotes the error term. 
 
                                                        
1 Exogeneity is not rejected in 30/64 cases (Appendix A.10) 
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Panel data has the added benefit of being able to allow us to correct for unobservable 
heterogeneity which, if left unchecked, could lead to biased coefficients (Roberts and Whited, 
2013). However, controlling for heterogeneity is not the main reason for employing panel 
data but rather the fact that we obtain more observations, variation, degrees of freedom and so 
forth, resulting in higher efficiency (Brooks, 2008). Additionally, we test for multicollinearity 
and conclude this is not an issue. The manual Breusch-Pagan Godfrey test for 
heteroskedasticity is employed in EViews, and found to be a concern; we thereby consistently 
apply White Robust Standard Errors (diagonal) to control for the problem of non-constant 
variations in the residuals (Brooks, 2008). 
 
3.6.1 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Selection of Instrumental Variable (IV) 
As mentioned in section 3.5 there are strong theoretical arguments that our performance 
measures and women in TMTs are determined simultaneously. A potential solution to this 
problem of endogeneity is to rely on exogenous variation, retrieved from an IV, and estimated 
using the two-stage least squares approach (2SLS). Reconsidering Model 1 from section 3.6 
the following two steps are estimated:  
 
Step 1: 𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑉1𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
Step 2: PERF𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐴𝑁̂ 𝑖𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑉1𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
In the first step we estimate the predicted values of the endogenous variable 𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐴𝑁̂ 𝑖𝑡 as a 
function of all exogenous variables (control variables) and instruments. The predicted values 
from the reduced form equation then replace the endogenous variable in the structural 
equation and are regressed as a function of the dependent variable. This process is performed 
automatically by the software (EViews), but is intuitively important: In the first step, the 
variation in the endogenous variable that is correlated with the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ("the bad part") 
is removed, making it possible to regress the endogenous variable with only the part of its 
variation that is uncorrelated with the error term ("the good variation") (Roberts and Whited, 
2013). It is thereby the IV’s job to isolate the "good" variation of the endogenous variable 
while ignoring the "bad". To be able to fulfill this function, the IV must be considered valid, 
and fulfill the relevance and exclusion criterion (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The relevance 
criterion states that the partial correlation between the endogenous variable and the IV may 
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not be zero, and can be controlled for by testing if the coefficients in the first stage equation 
are different from zero using the Wald test. The exclusion criterion on the other hand cannot 
be tested for since it requires that the Cov(𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) and the error terms are unobservable. This 
is consequently bridged theoretically, by making sure that the IV only has an effect on the 
dependent variable via its effect on the exogenous variable. 
 
Considering the scarcity of women in TMT’s and the multiple hurdles such as the "glass cliff" 
as well as other prejudices faced by women trying to make a career, it should be more likely 
for a woman to reach the top if the number of available positions is larger. In other words, we 
argue that, ceteris paribus, it is more likely that women are appointed to larger TMTs than 
smaller ones, and include TMT size as an instrument. To our knowledge there should be no 
relationship between TMT size and firm performance. It is rather that the size of a firm’s 
TMT is determined by a firm specific considerations in regards to the organizational structure. 
Having a large TMT for certain firms should lead to inefficiencies and vice versa. Adding 
industry dummies to the IV is however more questionable - and the discussion of its validity 
is made further in 4.2 and the weakness of our IV and the implications entailed are discussed 
in section 5. 
3.6.2 Panel methods – Fixed or Random effects 
As mentioned in section 3.5 the simultaneous relationship between our dependent and 
explanatory variable might not exist, considering the results of the Hausman tests (Appendix 
A.  employed. We thereby test for standard panel methods. Standard panel methods can 
broadly be categorized into two classes; fixed (FE) and random effects (RE). If the 
unobserved variable(s) causing endogeneity can be assumed as constant over time, panel 
methods can help alleviate concerns of endogeneity and Angrist and Pischke (2009) notes that 
fixed effects should reduce the problem of OV. The fixed effects model is easiest described as 
adding dummies for each cross-section and/or time period. For the cross-sectional case, each 
firm would thereby be given its own time-constant intercept. Or in other words, each firm will 
essentially be compared to itself in relation to women in TMTs and performance. Similarly to 
the FE model, cross-sectional random effects also imply that each firm is given its own time-
constant intercept, however this intercept now originates from a common sample intercept 
plus an additional random variable, which determines each cross-sectional units random 
deviation from the sample intercept. RE models are more efficient, since fewer parameters 
need to be estimated, however it is only valid when the composite error term𝜔𝑖𝑡 (or both 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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and 𝑣𝑖𝑡) is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables. FE is tested for using the redundant 
fixed effects test in EViews, while RE is tested for using the Hausman test. 
3.6.3 Robustness of the sample 
To test the robustness of our results we re-specify our sample data into three different 
samples, to make sure that any potential effects persists and/or explain our results; Firstly, we 
exclude financial firms from the sample which is how the literature generally treats the 
industry since they follow different regulations, which in turn might bias the estimates of the 
performance measures employed; Secondly, we exclude Denmark from the sample following 
the fact that the country consistently scores lower on gender diversity measures in comparison 
to the other two Scandinavian countries. Congruent with these reports, they also have the 
lowest percentage of firms with women in TMTs (37%) and an average of 8,5% of women 
TMTs, which can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of Women in TMTs by Country 
  n WTMT % TMT Size %WTMT 
Sweden 485 360 74% 8,0 16,8% 
Denmark 158 59 37% 5,3 8,5% 
Norway 280 160 57% 6,9 11,5% 
Total 923 579 63% 7,2 14% 
Source: Compiled by authors. The table provide an overview of the distribution of 
Women in TMTs by country 
 
Finally, we reproduce the idea of the sample used in Catalyst (2004) and compare the worst 
quartile with the best quartile. The quartiles are thereby divided into (i) Percentage of women 
in TMT and if same value (ii) those with highest Tobin’s Q is selected for each year. The 
distribution of the sample best vs. worst quartiles is summarized in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Table 4: The Best vs. Worst Quartiles 
  n N n/N 
Large-Cap 209 450 46% 
Mid-Cap 247 485 51% 
        
Swe 260 490 53% 
Den 66 160 41% 
Nor 130 285 46% 
Total 456 935 49% 
Source: Authors' calculations. The table present the distribution of 
the Best vs. Worst quartiles sample 
The previously mentioned tests are then employed for each of the samples to indicate if we 
reject exogeneity and 2SLS can be used, and whether any unobserved heterogeneity remains 
and there is need for fixed effects. 
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the study. Firstly we go through the descriptive statistics. 
Secondly, the results from 2SLS, and finally the panel estimation are presented. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and correlation 
From appendix A.3 we note that our initial hypotheses seem to be supported in regards to the 
Scandinavian region. Tobin’s Q is approximately 44% higher for firms with Women in 
TMTs, and we note that splitting the sample into Best vs. Worst Quartiles, the difference 
increases to approximately 70%. ROA, however, is approximately 1,4% lower, whereas once 
again the difference increases for the Best vs. Worst Quartiles where ROA becomes 
approximately 3% lower. Calculating the two-tailed t-test in Excel, we cannot reject the null 
at 1% level for either - and can thereby not conclude that the difference observed is the result 
of significantly different performance for firms with or without women. In other words the 
difference may indicate that women in TMTs lead to difference in performance. Still, in line 
with Hypothesis 2, we notice that this difference is percentually smaller and negative for the 
accounting based measure ROA. This plausibly indicates that women have less impact on 
objective performance compared to market performance. As noted by Dezö and Ross (2012), 
Tobin’s Q is ultimately determined by investor’s perception and the market, and there has 
been an increasing focus on diversity from an investor perspective in later years. However, we 
need to interpret the ROA with care. In line with the findings of Krishnan and Parsons (2008), 
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increasing gender diversity in TMTs results in higher earnings quality. That is, the reported 
accounting earnings will be closer to economic reality. The fact that ROA is lower for firms 
with women in their TMTs could thereby be a function of higher earnings quality as well.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables employed are reported in Appendix A.4. We note that all 
variables are non-normally distributed following the fact that skewness is different from zero 
and kurtosis different from 3. Our sample indicates that 63% of Scandinavian firms have 
women in TMTs, a number considerably higher than for Indonesia’s 38% (Darmadi, 2013), 
and for the U.S. S&P 1500 of 23,6% (Dezö and Ross. 2012). At the same time, the average 
percentage of women in TMTs of 14% is also higher compared to Indonesia with 
12%  (Darmadi, 2013) and the U.S. (353 firms from the Fortune 500) of 10,2% (Catalyst, 
2004). What is interesting to note, in relation to Catalyst (2004), is the difference in the 
percentage of women in TMTs for the Best vs. Worst Quartiles. Thir worst quartile has an 
average of 1,9% compared to our 0%, and their best quartile has an average of 20,3% 
compared to our 32%. The differences in Best vs. Worst Quartiles for our sample is 
summarized in Appendix A.5 
 
The mean values of Tobin’s Q and ROA are 1,28 and 4,3% respectively. Our Tobin’s Q are 
below what Darmadi (2010) finds in Indonesia with 1,85 and 3,6% respectively as well as 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) for Spain with 1,64 and 5,5%. On the other hand, the 
mean are larger than in the US sample of Dezö and Ross (2012), which find the mean of 
Tobin’s Q to be 1,04. The distribution of women in TMTs are presented in Appendix A.6. We 
note that 0% is generally the most common observation. Existing in the “gender balance 
zone” between 40-60%, are only about 8% of the observations for 2009-2011, 11% in 2012 
and 13% in 2013. This indicates an increase in gender diversity in TMTs for recent years, but 
more importantly stresses the fact that there is still a long road ahead.  Correlations for Model 
2 (N=422) are shown in Table 4 below, while correlations for Model 1 (N=881) are presented 
in Appendix A.7. 
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We note that the highest correlation observed for both models is -0,49 between LN_AGECAP 
and LEV. Generally the correlation are below 0,2, hence well below the rule of thumb for 
multicollinearity of 0,8 and we conclude that our sample does not suffer from 
multicollinearity. 
 
4.2 2SLS – First Stage Regressions and IV Correlations 
All IV specifications are tested using Wald-tests on the first stage regressions and are found to 
be significantly different from zero for all specifications - thereby satisfying the relevance 
condition. The exclusion condition, on the other hand, in regards to TMTSIZE as discussed in 
section 3.6.2 and as shown by the low correlation toward LN_TQ (0,086) and ROA (0,048) 
should also be satisfied (Appendix A.8). However, concerns of weak IV, and the bias this 
entails, are raised when we consider the R
2
 in the first stage equation. Only including 
TMTSIZE indicates that the model explains between 7-22% of the variation in WOMAN. It 
would thereby seem that albeit valid, TMTSIZE is weak, and not sufficient compared to the 
example of a strong IV put forth by Roberts and Whited (2013) where R
2
 of the first stage 
equation between the endogenous variables on IV was 0,4. In an attempt to strengthen our IV, 
industry dummies are added. We have already noted that the relevance condition is satisfied 
and we further note that the R
2
 increases for all first stage equations, and that the regression of 
endogenous variable on IV explains between 21-41% of the variation in WOMAN, and 6-7 
industry dummies out of 9 are found significant (Appendix A.9a and A.9b). However, the 
exclusion condition comes into question. Firstly, we note that the correlations for Healthcare 
(0,33) and Financials (-0,4) in relation to LN_TQ are significant and quite high. Secondly, 
from a theoretical perspective it is harder to defend the idea that industry dummies only affect 
firm performance through its effect on the endogenous variable. Nevertheless, (i) the high 
number of significant industries in the first stage equations, (ii) the fact that we can reject 
exogeneity in 34/64 cases (Appendix A.10) compared to 23/64 cases for when only using 
Mean St.d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. SIZE 16,46 1,81
2. LEV 0,26 0,19 0.263740**
3. LN_SALESG 0,04 0,36 -0.078065 -0.001449
4. MBOARD 0,07 0,25 -0.187405** -0.131326** 0.081531
5. LN_CAPEX_INT 0,05 0,06 -0.025808 0.135961** -0.011687 0.021317
6. LN_AGECAP -2,53 1,98 -0.129835** -0.489797** 0.015582 0.073670 -0.168809**
7. VAR_TEN 14,10 15,32 -0.085422 -0.040916 0.022992 -0.131030** 0.012277 -0.072311
8. VAR_EDU 1,62 1,50 -0.131231** -0.047560 -0.002362 0.027236 -0.034451 -0.004615 0.026668
9. PFOR 0,18 0,24 -0.046569 -0.156842** 0.057073 0.143680** 0.011838 0.235968** -0.049536 -0.012580
The table show the correlation between the independent variables in Model 2
Table 4: Correlation Matrix Model 2
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TMT Size, and (iii) the fact that R
2
 increases with 0,12 on average when industry dummies 
are added - results in the inclusion of industry dummies in the IV framework. Implications of 
this and the potentially weak IV employed are further discussed in section 5.   
4.3 2SLS 
The results from the 2SLS specifications for the original full sample are shown in the 
following sub-chapters through Tables 6a-6d for Model 1 and 2, with LN_TQ and ROA as 
dependent variables respectively. We previously noted that exogeneity was rejected for 34/64 
specifications (Appendix A.10). Despite being unable to reject exogeneity for all 
specifications, if we assume existence simultaneity, the 2SLS should be the appropriate 
estimation technique and is subsequently run for each specification. 
4.3.1 2SLS - Full sample 
In summary, exogeneity was rejected for all model specification except ROA Model 2 and 
one specification for ROA Model 1(PWTMT) at the 5% level. 
Table 6a: 2SLS (Full Sample) Model 1  
Dependent: LN_TQ 
Independent: WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH 
  Model 1 (N= 881) Model 1 (N= 881) Model 1 (N= 881) Model 1 (N= 881) 
  Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std 
C 2.498638** 0.223671 2.482248** 0.222389 1.804790** 0.370521 2.492002** 0.221987 
WTMT 0.344466** 0.087543 1.127511** 0.349161 0.475764 0.290047 0.645124** 0.169149 
SIZE -0.162680** 0.014041 -0.157071** 0.013611 -0.113190** 0.024198 -0.160790** 0.013815 
LEV -0.292330 0.138968 -0.327605* 0.140966 -0.022282 0.225633 -0.319452* 0.140211 
LN_SALESG 0.114874 0.074026 0.107829 0.074627 0.191107** 0.067925 0.110491 0.073372 
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.806244* 0.389026 0.803567* 0.383537 0.159490 0.482350 0.833663* 0.386107 
MBOARD 0.022751 0.077202 -0.013825 0.080616 0.075232 0.116759 0.004623 0.078750 
                  
R-squared 0.188034   0.195945   0.080047   0.192593   
Adjusted R-squared 0.182460   0.190425   0.066746   0.187050   
S.E. of regression 0.600072   0.597142   0.583953   0.598385   
F-statistic 39.53195**   37.91866**   7.066579**   39.01092**   
Hausman * - * * 
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 1 specification on the Full Sample with LN_TQ as dependent 
variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
 
We note that WOMEN has a significant positive relationship toward LN_TQ at the 5% 
significance level for all specification except BLAU, where the effect is insignificant (p-value 
of 0,1). This could potentially follow from the fact that Teachman (TEACH) by design is 
better at capturing small changes in diversity compared to BLAU. Regarding the control 
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variables we note that SIZE has consistently significant negative effect, that 
LN_CAPEX_INT has a significant positive effect except for BLAU, and that leverage is 
significantly negative in the PWTMT and TEACH models. In regards to economic 
significance, log-level
2
 implies that the coefficient measures the percentage change in the 
dependent variable following a unit increase in WOMAN variable. WTMT coefficient of 
0,345 would thereby indicate an 34,5% increase in TQ which in turn results in an indicated 
increase in firm value, approximately at the midpoint of the data, of 54,8 million SEK
3
. While 
increasing percentage of women by adding one woman to the average TMT (7 people) would 
indicate a 15,8% increase in TQ (0,14*1,128) and result in an implied increase in firm value 
of approximately 24,9 million SEK. However, we should interpret these numbers with care 
since following the fact that most firms already have women in their TMTs and since most 
observations consist of 0-20% women. Nevertheless, compared to the results of Dezö and 
Ross (2010) where WTMT increased firm value by $42 million, these effects are rather 
small.    
Table 6b: 2SLS (Full Sample) Model 1              
Dependent: ROA 
Independent: WTMT   PWTMT   BLAU   TEACH   
  Model 1 (N= 881) Model 1 (N= 881) Model 1 (N= 881) Model 1 (N= 881) 
  Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std 
C 1.008316** 0.048651 1.007411** 0.048539 1.007954** 0.048662 1.007889** 0.0000 
WOMAN 0.018839* 0.013200 0.053009 0.057067 0.043639 0.041416 0.031467 0.2414 
SIZE 0.003310** 0.002927 0.003691 0.002919 0.003554 0.002943 0.003492 0.2350 
LEV 
-
0.138712** 0.025773 
-
0.140515** 0.026014 
-
0.140106** 0.025918 
-
0.140146** 0.0000 
LN_SALESG 0.056715* 0.022527 0.056338* 0.022524 0.056439* 0.022546 0.056466* 0.0124 
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.132944 0.074045 0.131337 0.073786 0.131671 0.073812 0.133141 0.0729 
MBOARD -0.048973* 0.025053 -0.050966* 0.024680 -0.050399* 0.024851 -0.050068* 0.0448 
                  
R-squared 0.066595   0.073523   0.071117   0.069540   
Adjusted R-squared 0.060187   0.067163   0.064740   0.063152   
S.E. of regression 0.114861   0.114434   0.114582   0.114679   
F-statistic 13.19301**   13.03657**   13.07390**   13.10672**   
Hausman ** - * * 
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 1 Specification on the Full Sample with ROA as dependent 
variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
 
                                                        
2 100 ∗ 𝛽𝑖 =
%∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∆ 𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖
 
 
3 Average firm size 124,3 m (replacement value) multiplied by average TQ of 1,28 would thereby imply firm 
value of around 159,1 million (124,3*1,28) at the midpoint in the data. 
 24 
WTMT is the only specification found to have a significant positive impact on firm 
performance. The positive effect is quite surprising considering the comparative statistics 
shown in Appendix A.3 which indicated that WTMT had an ROA approximately 1,4 % lower 
than those without women. 
 
Regarding the control variables, leverage now has a significant negative effect, LN_SALESG 
has a significant positive impact and more interestingly MBOARD (only male boards) has a 
significant negative impact for all specifications. Size has a small significant positive impact, 
but only for the WTMT specification. In regards to economic significance, level-level
4
 is 
calculated somewhat differently than previously, the interpretation also change. The 
coefficient of 0,0188 indicate an increase in ROA to 0,064 (from average 0,047) which in turn 
would indicate that the inclusion of women in TMT increases net income by 2,34 million 
SEK, for the average midpoint firm, who has an implied net income of 5,6 million SEK. 
Table 6c: 2SLS (Full Sample) Model 2  
Dependent: LN_TQ 
Independent: WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH 
  Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) 
  Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std 
C 1.521907** 0.414053 1.464331** 0.403724 1.496966** 0.406835 1.496146* 0.407800 
WTMT 0.260275** 0.099343 1.421661** 0.485288 0.967464** 0.327920 0.587284* 0.212633 
SIZE -0.111659** 0.026741 -0.109743** 0.024995 -0.111830** 0.025591 -0.110908* 0.025969 
LEV 0.298975 0.279456 0.322218 0.269246 0.330885 0.271531 0.309216 0.274887 
LN_SALESG 0.182471** 0.065732 0.172631** 0.065743 0.176732** 0.065089 0.177406* 0.064990 
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.311480 0.447104 0.444145 0.469487 0.408166 0.463169 0.402051 0.461757 
MBOARD 0.107134 0.126369 0.107277 0.121744 0.110560 0.122393 0.107845 0.123615 
LN_AGECAP 0.036118** 0.013081 0.040350** 0.013656 0.041661** 0.013766 0.039866* 0.013704 
PFOR 0.251234 0.116254 0.305182** 0.115225 0.290285* 0.115907 0.276825** 0.116271 
VAR_TEN 0.004576* 0.001956 0.004609* 0.001842 0.004631* 0.001887 0.004560** 0.001907 
VAR_EDU 0.035950* 0.016955 0.037634* 0.017033 0.036802* 0.017065 0.036747** 0.016994 
                  
R-squared 0.110387   0.087156   0.090314   0.095904   
Adjusted R-squared 0.088742   0.064946   0.068181   0.073906   
S.E. of regression 0.577030   0.584516   0.583504   0.581708   
F-statistic 6.406810**   6.583525**   6.565944**   6.459771**   
Hausman - ** ** * 
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 2 specification on the Full Sample with LN_TQ as dependent 
variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
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We note that all WOMAN variables have a positive significant impact. The Coefficients have 
decreased for WTMT and TEACH, while they have increased for PWTMT and BLAU. In 
regards to the control variables, just as in the case with Model 1, size is found to have a 
negative significant impact for all specifications. However, LN_SALESG, LN_AGECAP as 
well as the informational diversity variables VAR_TEN and VAR_EDU show significant 
positive impact for all four specifications. While the social diversity variable PFOR has a 
significant positive effect on all models except WTMT where it is insignificant. Positive 
impact from informational diversity was to be expected considering the results of Bär et. al. 
(2009) while PFOR potentially could indicate more efficient activity on international markets, 
as well as taking part of a larger selection pool of potential management candidates and 
having a corporation that compete for these candidates. In other words, this result also falls 
under what could be expected. 
Table 6d: 2SLS (Full Sample) Model 2 
Dependent: ROA 
Independent: WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH 
  Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
C 0.987339** 0.081253 0.990247** 0.079116 0.988328** 0.079962 0.988449** 0.080050 
WOMAN -0.011896 0.019852 -0.086001 0.107781 -0.054708 0.071648 -0.029871 0.045900 
SIZE 0.007190 0.005275 0.007274 0.005094 0.007346 0.005183 0.007221 0.005198 
LEV -0.081967 0.041743 -0.085959* 0.040803 -0.085668* 0.041339 -0.083390* 0.041360 
LN_SALESG 0.017310 0.021917 0.017750 0.021924 0.017521 0.021906 0.017513 0.021888 
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.127785 0.092982 0.116470 0.095770 0.119906 0.094703 0.122031 0.095069 
MBOARD -0.112563** 0.039314 -0.113564** 0.038883 -0.113484** 0.039046 -0.112945** 0.039193 
LN_AGECAP 0.001917 0.002658 0.001404 0.002817 0.001415 0.002879 0.001637 0.002866 
PFOR -0.040134 0.025091 -0.042789 0.024091 -0.041896 0.024285 -0.041223 0.024552 
VAR_TEN -0.000146 0.000330 -0.000156 0.000336 -0.000155 0.000334 -0.000148 0.000332 
VAR_EDU -0.007162* 0.003356 -0.007248* 0.003333 -0.007199** 0.003337 -0.007197** 0.003339 
                  
R-squared 0.121566   0.124296   0.125887   0.124826   
Adjusted R-squared 0.100193   0.102989   0.104619   0.103532   
S.E. of regression 0.104965   0.104802   0.104707   0.104770   
F-statistic 5.293798**   5.341849**   5.329199**   5.307104**   
Hausman - - - - 
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for Model 2 specification on the Full Sample with ROA as dependent variable. 
An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
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None of the WOMAN variables are found significant for ROA Model 2. VAR_EDU and 
MBOARD are consistently significantly negative while LEV significantly negative for all 
except WTMT. We thereby note that fewer CV are significant compared to the Model 1 
specification, but that the negative effects of MBOARD and LEV persist. 
4.3.2 2SLS - Other specifications 
The 2SLS models are re-specified for each of the three samples and presented in Appendix 
A.11a-A.11d for best vs worst quartiles, A.12a-A12d for sample excluding financials and 
A.13a-A.13d for sample excluding Denmark. We note that BLAU is significant at the 5% 
level for all other specifications of model 1 LN_TQ and that the coefficient of PWTMT is 
approximately twice as large for PWTMT for the sample excluding financials,  however since 
mean of TA is lower - the effect on firm value is smaller compared to the full sample - 
indicating that adding a woman to a TMT of 7 would result in a 14 million SEK increase in 
implied firm value. Financial firms thereby effect the numerical interpretation of the 
economic significance, but largely the statistical implications are the same. However, for 
ROA Model 1, the only other specification where WOMAN is found significant is the sample 
excluding financials, where the coefficient is now negative.  In regards to Model 2 LN_TQ 
the general implications are the same, fewer CV are significant compared to the full sample 
and most surprisingly, WOMAN is found insignificant for the best vs worst quartiles sample 
(where we would expect the strongest effects). None of the ROA Model 2’s specified finds 
any significance between WOMAN and ROA.   
4.4 Panel Models 
The pooled regression is presented in Appendix A.14a and A.14b where WOMAN indicated 
as significant in all Model 1 with LN_TQ as dependent variable. The coefficient indicates a 
positive relationship, however no such significant relationship seems to exist in Model 2. The 
opposite hold for the models with ROA as dependent, here three of the Model 2 specifications 
(except PWTMT) finds significant relationships between WOMAN and the dependent 
variable. However, we note that the coefficients are now negative which can be explained by 
the observations from Appendix A.3. We also take note of the quite low R
2
 in ROA models 
between 0,08-0,12 and for LN_TQ models 0,12-0,2. All tests for cross-sectional fixed effects 
are found significant, and 30 out of the 64 (Appendix A.15) of the specified models do not 
reject the Hausman test for RE. In other words, implying that the composite error term is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables for almost half the models and that unobserved 
OV should be a non-issue for these 30 specifications.  
 27 
4.4.1 Panel Models - Full sample  
None, of the panel method estimations for the full sample finds any significant relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variable. As with the 2SLS estimation, we go through 
the outputs for the panel method and full sample below (Table 7a-7d). 
Table 7a: CS:FE (Full Sample) Model 1              
Dependent: LN_TQ 
Independent: WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH 
  Model 1 (N=881)  Model 1 (N=881)  Model 1 (N=881)  Model 1 (N=881)  
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
C -0.349051 1.549473 -0.390063 1.548019 -0.368093 1.548759 -0.348029 1.548869 
WTMT 0.062086 0.048477 0.166597 0.163755 0.169458 0.137289 0.138911 0.094855 
SIZE 0.015424 0.095350 0.018987 0.095195 0.016994 0.095292 0.015234 0.095311 
LEV 0.245816 0.299873 0.244068 0.300183 0.241531 0.298916 0.238764 0.298314 
LN_SALESG 0.032295 0.063608 0.031989 0.063444 0.033089 0.063330 0.033369 0.063252 
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.014572 0.372175 -0.003251 0.370881 -0.001753 0.369629 0.010267 0.370002 
MBOARD 0.001955 0.068647 0.005083 0.069643 0.005693 0.069359 0.005423 0.069126 
                  
R-squared 0.830044   0.829845   0.829997   0.830171   
Adjusted R-squared 0.783559   0.783305   0.783498   0.783720   
S.E. of regression 0.308758   0.308940   0.308802   0.308644   
F-statistic 17.85592**   17.83071** 17.84992** 17.87194** 
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 1 specification and the Full Sample with LN_TQ as the 
dependent  variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05  
 
For dependent variable LN_TQ and Model 1 we note that the significant positive effects seen 
in the pooled regression dissipate and that none of the CVs are found significant.  
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Table 7b: CS:RE (Full Sample) Model 1              
Dependent: ROA 
Independent: WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH 
  Model 1 (N=881)  Model 1 (N=881)  Model 1 (N=881)  Model 1 (N=881)  
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
C 0.975023** 0.073359 0.975834** 0.073600 0.975696** 0.073551 0.975655** 0.073486 
WTMT -0.006366 0.011052 -0.010207 0.048943 -0.008663 0.035941 -0.006886 0.023708 
SIZE 0.006713 0.004411 0.006499 0.004429 0.006527 0.004440 0.006554 0.004434 
LEV -0.173636** 0.040871 -0.173655** 0.040766 -0.173579** 0.040677 -0.173479** 0.040620 
LN_SALESG 0.059722** 0.017967 0.059780** 0.017955 0.059749** 0.017995 0.059746** 0.017984 
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.163520* 0.066710 0.165394* 0.067201 0.165406* 0.067031 0.164889* 0.066917 
MBOARD -0.042426 0.025384 -0.042235 0.025403 -0.042283 0.025455 -0.042311 0.025439 
                  
R-squared 0.090876   0.090547   0.090548   0.090579   
Adjusted R-squared 0.084635   0.084304   0.084304   0.084336   
S.E. of regression 0.082848   0.082820   0.082844   0.082854   
F-statistic 14.56089** 14.50290**   14.50297**   14.50849**   
The Cross Sectional Random Effects regression results for Model 1 and the Full Sample with ROA as the dependent variable. 
**p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05  
Similar effects are seen for ROA Model 1, where none of WOMAN variables are significant. 
In regards to CV, LEV is found significantly negative, while LN_SALESG and 
LN_CAPEX_INT are found significantly positive for all specifications. 
Table 7c: CS:RE (Full Sample) Model 2             
Dependent: LN_TQ 
Independent: WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH 
  Model 2 (N=442)  Model 2 (N=442)  Model 2 (N=442)  Model 2 (N=442)  
  Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
C 1.847342** 0.591570 1.800606** 0.592188 1.813603** 0.591062 1.822293* 0.590796 
WOMAN 0.081091 0.060927 0.236388 0.235187 0.208843 0.183477 0.174151 0.123303 
SIZE -0.121317** 0.036059 -0.117742** 0.035824 -0.118981** 0.035802 -0.120135* 0.035742 
LEV -0.153276 0.252813 -0.163296 0.255468 -0.160270 0.254339 -0.157724 0.252920 
LN_SALESG 0.128831** 0.047764 0.127415** 0.047718 0.128294** 0.047517 0.127890* 0.047321 
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.020638 0.442332 0.041174 0.451353 0.035940 0.447460 0.052608 0.447017 
MBOARD -0.070869 0.102611 -0.063143 0.104791 -0.063427 0.104257 -0.061892 0.103707 
LN_AGECAP -0.004236 0.021995 -0.006376 0.021871 -0.005336 0.021839 -0.004478 0.021838 
PFOR 0.384353* 0.156103 0.405134** 0.155345 0.399586 0.154996 0.392438** 0.155093 
VAR_TEN 0.008772** 0.002507 0.008670** 0.002478 0.008681** 0.002489 0.008667* 0.002485 
VAR_EDU -0.013651 0.014720 -0.011715 0.014939 -0.011708 0.014861 -0.011558 0.014807 
                  
R-squared 0.102308   0.099932   0.100733   0.102490   
Adjusted R-
squared 0.080467   0.078033   0.078853   0.080653   
S.E. of 
regression 0.283027   0.283442   0.283240   0.282844   
F-statistic 4.684090**   4.563237**   4.603910**   4.693379**   
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 2 specificaton and the Full Sample with LN_TQ as the 
dependent variable.  **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05  
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LN_TQ Model 2 with RE once again finds no significant effects of WOMAN. In regards to 
CV,  VAR_TEN and LN_SALESG have a significant positive effect while SIZE is negative. 
PFOR is negatively significant for all specifications except BLAU.   
Table 7d: CE:FE (Full Sample) Model 2 
Dependent: ROA 
Independent: WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH 
  Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) Model 2 (N=422) 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
C 1.452745* 0.624596 1.487137* 0.624123 1.479992* 0.626852 1.479464* 0.624788 
WOMAN -0.008928 0.010540 -0.010422 0.090175 -0.012071 0.060109 -0.008086 0.034627 
SIZE -0.017854 0.039391 -0.020139 0.039456 -0.019645 0.039605 -0.019621 0.039442 
LEV -0.177211* 0.082778 -0.176015* 0.082143 -0.176133* 0.082272 -0.176120* 0.082293 
LN_SALESG 0.053274** 0.020337 0.053558** 0.020305 0.053473** 0.020359 0.053477** 0.020348 
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.209986 0.112385 0.211033 0.115229 0.210797 0.113815 0.210553 0.113264 
MBOARD -0.089954 0.049483 -0.089788 0.051842 -0.090009 0.051210 -0.089819 0.050606 
LN_AGECAP 0.026626 0.018578 0.026929 0.018395 0.026925 0.018419 0.026866 0.018457 
PFOR 0.072912 0.073042 0.068715 0.073611 0.069436 0.073624 0.069662 0.073609 
VAR_TEN -0.001001 0.001150 -0.000984 0.001146 -0.000985 0.001145 -0.000984 0.001145 
VAR_EDU 0.001261 0.005022 0.001213 0.004615 0.001159 0.004689 0.001177 0.004777 
                  
R-squared 0.674583   0.674299   0.674329   0.674330   
Adjusted R-
squared 0.555194   0.554804   0.554845   0.554848   
S.E. of regression 0.073800   0.073832   0.073829   0.073829   
F-statistic 5.650258**   5.642935**   5.643708**   5.643751**   
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 2 specification and the Full Sample with ROA as the 
dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05  
 
In ROA Model 2 with FE, once again none of the WOMAN variables are found to be 
significant. In regards to CV leverage is consistently negatively significant, while 
LN_SALEG is significantly positive.  
4.4.2 Other specifications 
Generally the same conclusions can be drawn for the other specifications where all except one 
find no significant relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory.  Outputs 
from the three remaining samples are presented in Appendix A.16a-A.16d for best vs worst 
quartiles, A.17a-A17d for sample excluding financials and A.18a-A.18d for the sample 
excluding Denmark. The exception being the RE Model 1 (LN_TQ - WTMT) presented in 
specification for the sample excluding financials Appendix A.16aa, which indicates that 
including a women in the TMT would result in an increase in firm value at the midpoint in the 
data of approximately 4,5 million SEK.  However, following the fact that only one of the 
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specified panel methods models finds a significant relationship between performance and 
women in the TMT, we consider the general result of “no significant relationship” to be 
generally applicable. 
5. Discussion 
As became apparent in section 4.2, the instruments employed can be considered weak, which 
in turn might severely bias inference for all 2SLS models. Adding industry variables to the 
instrument list is from an asymptotic efficiency perspective a good thing, but for finite 
samples more does not necessarily mean better (Roberts and Whited, 2013). At the same time, 
the validity argument of using industry dummies comes into question. As noted by Angrist 
and Pischke (2009), the 2SLS method should be considered consistent, but biased, and 
contrary to the OLS it only promises to return results close to the causal effects in question for 
large samples. Making the 2SLS estimations of Model 2, specifically in regards to the other 
sample specifications employed, come into question. This bias is most severe if the 
instrument in question can be considered weak and many. The most common evidence for 
weak instruments is large standard errors (SE), but even in less extreme cases when SE 
remain small they could still cause bias (Roberts and Whited, 2013). We note that the SEs in 
the full sample 2SLS models in general approximately doubles in comparison to the pooled 
regression. The smallest changes are seen in general for WTMT, where the change in SE is 
hardly noticeable in most cases. The most extreme example is seen in ROA Model 1 for 
TEACH, where SE increase from 0,017 in the pooled regression to 0,24 in the 2SLS. Further 
indicating that our IV is weak. It should also be mentioned that the burden on IV in general is 
quite severe for corporate finance, following the fact that potentially more than one regressor 
is endogenous since few variables employed in the research field can be considered truly 
exogenous (Roberts and Whited, 2013). These considerations also make it impossible to apply 
both panel methods and 2SLS as done by for example Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), 
since we are uncertain which part of the endogeneity concerns are actually resolved by the IV. 
Including panel methods could thereby potentially result in controlling for the same problem 
twice, causing further biasing inference. The inference from the 2SLS models should thereby 
be interpreted with care. 
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6. Conclusion 
Generally the results from our regressions can be described as quizzical, supporting the notion 
of the IV framework as a risky implementation for solving the endogeneity concerns in our 
data. The fact that we cannot reject exogeneity in 30 out of 64 specifications are further 
worrisome, making the existence of a simultaneity problem come into question. When 
simultaneity is taken into account, there seems to be some support for the notion that, ceteris 
paribus, gender diverse firms perform better than their counterparts. At least in relation to 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. However, the significant relationships observed 
could be due to inference problems in relation to a weak IV, most importantly the size of the 
significant coefficients and subsequent economic interpretation comes under harsher scrutiny. 
The relationship becomes more unlikely in relation to accounting based performance, or 
viewed in light of Haslam et.al.(2010) our results seem to support the premonition that gender 
diversity in fact does not affect objective firm performance, but rather affects the market 
perceptions of the firm, thereby only increasing the subjective value. 
 
At the same time we note that there seems to be a move toward more gender diverse TMTs 
during the sample period and that investors have become more interested in diversity issues in 
later years (Dezö and Ross, 2012). It would thereby not be all that surprising if gender 
diversity was viewed favourably in the egalitarian Scandinavia, and that this study finds 
similar evidence as those previously (Catalyst (2004); Krishnan and Park (2005); Dezö and 
Ross (2012); Francoeur et. al (2008)) However, if simultaneity is not taken into account, there 
seems to be no significant relationship between women in TMTs and performance, which 
from a liberal feminist point of view is exactly what would be expected i.e. that gender by 
itself does not have an effect on firm performance. However, no matter if the inference is too 
biased and there are no positive effect, or if no significant effects exist, there should be 
nothing from an economical perspective hindering the inclusion of more women in TMTs. 
………………. 
This paper adds to the scarce international evidence, however it only focuses on the largest 
firms in Scandinavia, covers a relatively short time period and diversity measures are 
computed solely on publicly available information. Future studies may need to consider these 
constraints, and most importantly further investigate the simultaneity relationship considered 
in this study.    
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 Appendix 
A.1 Literature summary 
 
A.1 Literature summary
Author(s) Year Country(ies) Main concern Data Method Dependent variable(s) Effect on performance
2008 U.S Women on Boards Panel data Panel method and 2SLS Tobin's Q Positive
2009 U.S Panel data Panel method and 2SLS ROA and Tobin's Q Negative
Erhardt et. al. 2003 U.S Board Diversity Cross-sectional data Hierarchical regression ROA & ROI Positive
Haslam et. al. 2010 UK Women on Boards Panel data ANOVA ROA & Tobin's Q
2011 UK Women on Boards Cross-sectional data Odds Ratio (95%) Positive
Vintila et. al. 2008 Romania Women on Boards Panel data Panel method Tobin's Q Positive
Randøy et. al. 2006 Scandinavia Board Diversity Cross-sectional data ROA None
Rose 2007 Denmark Women on Boards Panel data Tobin's Q None
Smith et. al. 2006 Denmark Women on Boards Panel data Panel method and 2SLS Positive
Lee and James 2007 U.S Panel data Standard Event Study 
CAR (Cumulative Abnornal 
Returns)
Negative
Carpenter 2002 U.S TMT diversity Panel data Panel method ROA Positive
Bär et. al. 2009 U.S TMT diversity Panel data Panel method Negative
Nielsen et. al. 2013 Switzerland TMT diversity Panel data Hierarchical regression ROA Positive
Zhang 2007 China TMT diversity Cross-sectional data Hierarchical regression EVA Varying
Catalyst 2004 U.S Panel data Panel method ROE & TRS Positive
2004 U.S Cross-sectional data Hierarchical regression ROA Positive
Dezö and Ross 2012 U.S Panel data Panel method Tobin's Q Positive
Darmadi 2010 Indonesia Cross-sectional data ROA & Tobin's Q Negative
2008 Canada Panel data ROE Positive
This table summarizes and gives an overview of relavant literature
Source: Compiled by authors
Negative on Tobin's Q 
but none on ROA
Staged Cross-Sectional 
regression
Cross-sectional regression 
Analysis
Various accounting 
measures
Various performance 
measures
ANOVA & Ordered Logistic 
Regression
Correlation & Regression 
Analysis
Gender diversity in 
TMTs
Gender diversity in 
TMTs
Gender diversity in 
TMTs
Gender diversity in 
TMTs
Gender diversity in 
TMTs
Gender diversity on 
Boards
Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera 
Adams and 
Ferreira
McCann and 
Wheeler
Krishnan and 
Park 
 Fama-French 3 factor 
context
Francoeur et. 
al
TMT appointment 
reactions
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A.2 Information Gathering 
 
A.2 Distribution of Firms that Include Information 
  N TMT Var_Ten Var_Edu  
Large-Cap 450 98,90% 71,10% 69,80% 
Mid-Cap 485 98,60% 64,30% 59,80% 
          
Source: Authors' calculations. The  table depicts the % of 
reported information in regard to informational diversity 
variables. 
 
 
A.3 Performance w/ or w.o/ Women 
 
 
 
 
 
WTMT  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs. WTMT  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.
0 1,054234 0,115945 343 0 1,169989 1,01132 343
1 1,039597 0,12407 -1,39% 580 1 1,347508 1,455839 580 43,95%
All 1,045037 0,121258 923 All 1,281539 1,310624 923
WTMT  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs. WTMT  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.
0 1,062844 0,128792 232 0 1,460034 1,111852 232
1 1,030499 0,163557 -3,04% 232 1 1,577549 1,892646 232 70,22%
All 1,046671 0,147934 464 All 1,518791 1,551585 464
WTMT  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs. WTMT  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.
0 1,054214 0,12011 290 0 1,258348 1,064751 290
1 1,04078 0,136696 -1,27% 410 1 1,620862 1,647101 410 54,69%
All 1,046345 0,130161 700 All 1,470678 1,445012 700
WTMT  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs. WTMT  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.
0 1,066117 0,122946 245 0 1,222834 1,0411 245
1 1,039459 0,121891 -2,50% 520 1 1,308165 1,386128 520 33,14%
All 1,047996 0,122782 765 All 1,280837 1,285676 765
Source: Compiled and calculated by authors. The table present an overview over the average performance of companies with and 
without  women in TMTs for each sample. The value in percnt describe how the TMTs with women performs with 
regards to those without.
Best vs. Worst Quartiles
ROA TQ
A.3 Average Performance w. Women and w/o Women
Full Sample
Excluding Denmark
Excluding Financials
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A.4 Descriptive Statistics 
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A.5 Best and Worst Companies 
 
A.5 Comparison of Best and Worst Quartiles           
  ROA Tq Mboard WTMT PWTMT Blau Tech TMTSize N 
Best 1,030 1,58 0,095 1 0,32 0,42 0,61 8,0 232 
Worst 1,063 1,46 0,086 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 5,7 232 
Tot 1,047 1,519 0,091 0,500 0,160 0,209 0,304 6,869 464 
                    
Source: Authors' calculations. This table provide an overview over the best and worst quartiles of the sample in 
regards to the amount of women in TMTs and performance measures  
 
A.6 Women in TMTs 
 
 
 
A.7 Correlation Matrix  
 
 
 
 
 
N N N N N
0% 78 43,3% 73 39,2% 70 37,4% 68 35,8% 39 23,9%
0 < x ≤ 10% 9 5,0% 12 6,5% 13 7,0% 10 5,3% 13 8,0%
10 < x ≤ 20% 44 24,4% 53 28,5% 54 28,9% 59 31,1% 53 32,5%
20 < x ≤ 30% 34 18,9% 32 17,2% 34 18,2% 32 16,8% 35 21,5%
30 < x ≤ 40% 13 7,2% 14 7,5% 13 7,0% 11 5,8% 11 6,7%
40 < x ≤ 50% 1 0,6% 1 0,5% 2 1,1% 8 4,2% 11 6,7%
50 < x ≤ 60% 1 0,6% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 2 1,1% 0 0,0%
60 < x ≤ 70% 0 0,0% 1 0,5% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
70 < x ≤ 80% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 1 0,5% 0 0,0% 1 0,6%
A.6 Women in TMTs - Frequency of Distribution
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: Compiled by authors. This table shows the distribution of the number of observations and percentage of women in TMTs 
for the years 2009-2013
1 2 3 4
1. SIZE 
2. LEV 0.311670**
3. LN_SALESG -0.110593**-0.016741
4. LN_CAPEX_INT -0.025434 0.204233**0.019554
5. MBOARD -0.127416**-0.062209 7.90E-05 -0.028344
The table show the correlation between the independent variables 
in Model 1
A.7 Correlation Matrix Model 1
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A.8 Correlation Matrix Instrumental Variables 
A.8 Correlation Matrix Instrumental Variables 
  ROA LN_TQ 
TMTSIZE  0,048682 0,085698* 
Utilities -0,054009 -0,021183 
Telecommunications 0,038713 0,018848 
Technology 0,135273* 0,190889* 
Oil and gas -0,153658* 0,007945 
Industrials 0,035434 0,001482 
Healthcare -0,136094* 0,328855* 
Financials -0,019135 -0,398547* 
Consumer Services 0,093557* 0,178826* 
Consumer Goods 0,056956 0,020825 
Basic Materials 0,009687 -0,066227** 
      
The table present the correlation between the 
instrumental variables and the dependent variables. 
**p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
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A.9 First Stage Equation 
 
 
A.9a First stage equation: WTMT and PWTMT 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
C 0.107535** 0.290098** 0.561620** 0.146145 0.051918** 0.115023**0.199791**0.074846
TMTSIZE 0.072227** 0.073283** 0.075597** 0.091232** 0.011884** 0.012710**0.014227**0.014192**
Basic Materials -0.102663 -0.111434 -0.013191 -0.077410**-0.076119**-0.027262
Consumer Goods -0.297571** -0.318465** -0.147528 -0.118047**-0.119939**-0.060454**
Consumer Services -0.024316 -0.051245 0.104322 -0.004879 -0.011814 0.040763
Health Care -0.191336** -0.213017** 0.021833 -0.053869**-0.059486**0.033500
Industrials -0.324565** -0.348680** -0.191041* -0.112258**-0.114564**-0.061101**
Oil and gas -0.259147** -0.284816** -0.204103* -0.098826**-0.100212**-0.069127**
Technology -0.296467** -0.326156** -0.205892 -0.114796**-0.121826**-0.071173**
Telecommunications 0.037420 0.047215 0.233003* -0.002635 0.005267 0.084311*
Utilities -0.451937** -0.517442** -0.069875 -0.095301* -0.120667**-0.007223
SIZE -0.017719 -0.003277 -0.006073* -0.000271
LEV 0.073008 -0.649071** 0.017446 -0.127315**
LN_SALESG -0.044045 -0.015034 -0.006011 0.001262
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.123905 0.374621 0.020145 0.030266
MBOARD -0.199049* 0.002651 -0.068741**
LN_AGECAP -0.074898** -0.014344**
PFOR -0.031271 -0.036359
VAR_TEN -0.002800 -0.000646
VAR_EDU -0.005139 -0.002435
R-squared 0.217974 0.305123 0.310544 0.410426 0.075504 0.213882 0.230565 0.310652
Adjusted R-squared 0.217125 0.297504 0.298588 0.382561 0.074500 0.205262 0.217222 0.278070
N 923 923 881 422 923 923 881 442
WTMT PWTMT
The table shows the first stage regression results for WTMT and PWTMT stepwise adding explanatory variables; starting at 
the instruments and subsequently Model 1 and Model 2 specifications
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A.10 Summary Hausman Test 
 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
C 0.061822** 0.137737** 0.232948** 0.076979 0.085917** 0.197228** 0.348909** 0.123851
TMTSIZE 0.019280** 0.020025** 0.021251** 0.022760** 0.031028** 0.032007** 0.033777** 0.036942**
Basic Materials -0.074436** -0.076016** -0.025093 -0.097186** -0.099534** -0.028118
Consumer Goods -0.140505** -0.145705** -0.077679** -0.199760** -0.208523** -0.110142**
Consumer Services 0.002923 -0.005903 0.050422 -0.002927 -0.016120 0.070606
Health Care -0.061285* -0.069357* 0.038134 -0.099169** -0.111665** 0.031851
Industrials -0.137008** -0.143295** -0.082971** -0.199701** -0.209846** -0.121470**
Oil and gas -0.115085** -0.121531** -0.092478** -0.165205** -0.174488** -0.129027**
Technology -0.136242** -0.143826** -0.091173* -0.194187** -0.206740** -0.129349*
Telecommunications 0.016900 0.021847 0.110797* 0.026024 0.034456 0.160843**
Utilities -0.137652* -0.170155** -0.013278 -0.217331** -0.263938** -0.027018
SIZE -0.006556 0.000488 -0.010340 -0.000805
LEV 0.030029 -0.198756** 0.052394 -0.294763**
LN_SALESG -0.011143 -0.001192 -0.016950 -0.001289
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.033042 0.076281 0.022901 0.067600
MBOARD -0.002944 -0.091481** -0.006218 -0.124856**
LN_AGECAP -0.023373** -0.036323**
PFOR -0.042581 -0.045790
VAR_TEN -0.000927 -0.001298
VAR_EDU -0.002537 -0.003050
R-squared 0.121469 0.250871 0.261225 0.346681 0.143614 0.265496 0.276287 0.360350
Adjusted R-squared 0.120516 0.242656 0.248414 0.315803 0.142684 0.257442 0.263737 0.330118
N 923 923 881 422 923 923 881 442
A.9b First stage equation: BLAU and TEACH  
BLAU TEACH
The table shows the first stage regression results for BLAU and TEACH stepwise adding explanatory variables; starting at the 
instruments and subsequently Model 1 and Model 2 specifications
A.10 Hausman test 
ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ
WTMT 0,005 0,012 0,000 0,000 0,0194 0,007 0,0151 0,003
PWTMT 0,085 0,056 0,046 0,004 0,326 0,000 0,472 0,029
BLAU 0,036 0,015 0,021 0,000 0,122 0,000 0,226 0,006
TECH 0,019 0,019 0,018 0,000 0,071 0,001 0,135 0,005
N 881 881 446 446 688 688 734 734
ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ
WTMT 0,371 0,057 0,267 0,028 0,6515 0,620 0,2845 0,032
PWTMT 0,810 0,007 0,462 0,020 0,996 0,782 0,338 0,532
BLAU 0,585 0,007 0,339 0,018 0,8116 0,134 0,8152 0,192
TECH 0,443 0,014 0,256 0,020 0,658 0,241 0,919 0,119
N 422 422 188 188 342 342 347 347
The table summarise the p-values of the Hausman test for 2SLS with each sample for Model 1 and Model 2. The numbers 
in grey show the significant p-values (0≤p≤0,05) , which is a total of 34 in this table.
Full Sample Best vs. Worst Quartiles Excluding Financials Excluding Denmark
Model 2
Full Sample
Model 1
Best vs. Worst Quartiles Excluding Financials Excluding Denmark
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A.11 Results 2SLS: Best vs. Worst Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent:
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std
C 3.307087* 0.401363 3.242224** 0.398107 3.287838** 0.400785 3.293405** 0.400898
WTMT 0.429081* 0.140131 1.045874** 0.386885 0.970617** 0.317627 0.678867** 0.221662
SIZE -0.199439* 0.026488 -0.191740** 0.025812 -0.197220** 0.026274 -0.197859** 0.026330
LEV -0.429245** 0.212800 -0.471207* 0.214000 -0.443282* 0.212520 -0.439574* 0.212576
LN_SALESG 0.176851** 0.084608 0.172051 0.092644 0.174519* 0.088577 0.175174* 0.087508
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.566984 0.644624 0.568245 0.610874 0.575262 0.632333 0.573475 0.635646
MBOARD -0.046312 0.098286 -0.049511 0.098183 -0.052058 0.098856 -0.050667 0.098703
R-squared 0.120620 0.159599 0.132617 0.129423
Adjusted R-squared0.105882 0.145514 0.118080 0.114832
S.E. of regression 0.582514 0.569457 0.578527 0.579591
F-statistic 20.86917** 19.83472** 20.68796** 20.74536**
Hausman
A.11a 2SLS (Best vs. Worst Quartiles) Model 1
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446)
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 1 specification on the Best vs. Worst Quartiles sample with 
LN_TQ as dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and 
*0,01<p≤0,05 
** ** ** **
Independent:
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std
C 0.966811* 0.082561 0.965932* 0.081315 0.966675* 0.082191 0.966715* 0.082296
WTMT 0.024737 0.019053 0.082447 0.055405 0.060061 0.043952 0.041122 0.030519
SIZE 0.006067 0.005145 0.006096 0.004996 0.006070 0.005099 0.006069 0.005112
LEV -0.163693* 0.042546 -0.164596* 0.042463 -0.163994* 0.042474 -0.163916* 0.042492
LN_SALESG 0.058570 0.032167 0.058515 0.032082 0.058579 0.032132 0.058580 0.032142
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.316844** 0.142242 0.320774** 0.141944 0.318520** 0.142104 0.318052** 0.142139
MBOARD -0.072618** 0.033428 -0.073346** 0.033339 -0.073124** 0.033352 -0.072987** 0.033371
R-squared 0.068726 0.071320 0.070441 0.069977
Adjusted R-squared0.055998 0.058627 0.057736 0.057266
S.E. of regression 0.139411 0.139217 0.139283 0.139318
F-statistic 7.963947** 8.014922** 7.979625** 7.974992**
Hausman
Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446)
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 1 specification on the Best vs. Worst Quartiles Sample with 
ROA as dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and 
*0,01<p≤0,05 
A.11b 2SLS (Best vs. Worst Quartiles) Model 1
Dependent: ROA
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
** * * *
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Independent:
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std
C 2.769484* 0.572918 2.727626* 0.559227 2.753802* 0.567428 2.758782* 0.568978
WTMT 0.116865 0.124222 0.490140 0.422106 0.327884 0.302856 0.216943 0.207204
SIZE -0.170503* 0.034774 -0.169365* 0.033853 -0.170295* 0.034408 -0.170402* 0.034514
LEV 0.165635 0.411842 0.187013 0.411611 0.177843 0.411054 0.174938 0.411237
LN_SALESG 0.099637 0.057678 0.098210 0.055174 0.099176 0.056274 0.099392 0.056638
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.289746 0.806850 0.360517 0.825755 0.326974 0.817500 0.316524 0.814779
MBOARD 0.201121 0.190205 0.210589 0.190540 0.204521 0.190114 0.203504 0.190123
LN_AGECAP 0.039866 0.027851 0.041573 0.027652 0.041019 0.027677 0.040761 0.027726
PFOR 0.178901 0.186532 0.187900 0.186349 0.183970 0.186696 0.182551 0.186671
VAR_TEN 0.004788** 0.002315 0.004886** 0.002266 0.004844** 0.002296 0.004830** 0.002302
VAR_EDU 0.014077 0.024427 0.015099 0.024126 0.014319 0.024349 0.014223 0.024377
R-squared 0.276071 0.272667 0.273175 0.273853
Adjusted R-squared0.235171 0.231574 0.232111 0.232828
S.E. of regression 0.525050 0.526283 0.526099 0.525853
F-statistic 7.618240** 7.691835** 7.660091** 7.648754**
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 2 specification on the Best vs. Worst Quartiles sample with 
LN_TQ as dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and 
*0,01<p≤0,05 
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 2 (N= 188) Model 2 (N= 188) Model 2 (N= 188) Model 2 (N= 188)
Dependent: LN_TQ
A.11c 2SLS (Best vs Worst Quartiles) Model 2 
* * * *
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.157644** 0.133756 1.166533** 0.130538 1.161492** 0.131931 1.160384** 0.132409
WOMAN -0.025459 0.020683 -0.085192 0.073017 -0.064671 0.051284 -0.043842 0.034924
SIZE -0.002247 0.008145 -0.002702 0.007946 -0.002408 0.008032 -0.002360 0.008062
LEV -0.055341 0.064189 -0.054508 0.062529 -0.055620 0.063285 -0.055593 0.063521
LN_SALESG 0.009419 0.023694 0.010054 0.023891 0.009691 0.023803 0.009607 0.023774
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.468176* 0.189699 0.459743* 0.192283 0.462644* 0.190694 0.464149* 0.190396
MBOARD -0.168044* 0.069502 -0.169315* 0.069906 -0.168539* 0.069576 -0.168392* 0.069549
LN_AGECAP 0.005839 0.004359 0.006038 0.004199 0.005843 0.004262 0.005835 0.004288
PFOR -0.048471 0.055783 -0.049764 0.055515 -0.049344 0.055612 -0.049111 0.055656
VAR_TEN -0.000569 0.000508 -0.000568 0.000510 -0.000571 0.000509 -0.000571 0.000509
VAR_EDU -0.010928* 0.004683 -0.011217* 0.004668 -0.011028 0.004669 -0.010998*
R-squared 0.209214 0.205196 0.208856 0.209055
Adjusted R-squared0.164537 0.160291 0.164159 0.164369
S.E. of regression 0.122654 0.122965 0.122681 0.122666
F-statistic 4.205095** 4.207805** 4.214321** 4.212040**
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 2 specification and the Best vs. Worst Quartiles sample 
with ROA as dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 
and *0,01<p≤0,05 
TEACH
Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188)
WTMT PWTMT BLAU
Dependent: ROA
A.11d 2SLS (Best vs. Worst Quartiles) Model 2
- - - -
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A.12 Results 2SLS: Excluding Financials 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent:
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std
C 2.050276* 0.290391 1.869255* 0.288711 1.950249* 0.286759 1.973119* 0.286985
WTMT 0.418522* 0.098018 2.287865* 0.388640 1.565165* 0.283823 0.971991* 0.188918
SIZE -0.130005* 0.018710 -0.120775* 0.017883 -0.126602* 0.018047 -0.127234* 0.018206
LEV -0.326040 0.183461 -0.287460 0.186134 -0.280711 0.184912 -0.302927 0.184178
LN_SALESG 0.104619 0.090504 0.082811 0.086309 0.087113 0.086241 0.090444 0.087082
LN_CAPEX_INT -0.044524 0.415617 -0.107674 0.415759 -0.087943 0.416994 -0.046237 0.413427
MBOARD 0.101557 0.093325 0.121201 0.097588 0.122135 0.095648 0.116407 0.094632
R-squared 0.112149 0.088997 0.095438 0.104697
Adjusted R-squared 0.104326 0.080970 0.087468 0.096809
S.E. of regression 0.609637 0.617535 0.615348 0.612190
F-statistic 20.18080** 22.78111** 22.29873** 21.60537**
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 1 såecification on the Excluding Financials sample with LN_TQ 
as dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and 
*0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 2 (N=688) Model 2 (N=688) Model 2 (N=688) Model 2 (N=688)
** ** ** **
A.12a 2SLS (Excluding Financials) Model 1
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Independent:
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 0.956049* 0.061042 0.959309** 0.060335 0.958638** 0.060812 0.958510** 0.061018
WOMAN -0.023071** 0.012147 -0.011986 0.075944 -0.000992 0.052762 0.002965 0.033906
SIZE 0.008874** 0.003960 0.007737* 0.003844 0.007682 0.003918 0.007612 0.003937
LEV -0.185375* 0.038703 -0.175696** 0.038145 -0.174610** 0.038406 -0.173781** 0.038355
LN_SALESG 0.063361** 0.028496 0.062905* 0.028431 0.062750* 0.028432 0.062653* 0.028438
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.098247 0.080644 0.108214 0.082692 0.108800 0.082805 0.109479 0.082993
MBOARD -0.066479** 0.031313 -0.063002* 0.031773 -0.062582* 0.031870 -0.062259 0.031871
R-squared 0.097128 0.089197 0.087983 0.086617
Adjusted R-squared 0.089173 0.081172 0.079948 0.078570
S.E. of regression 0.122542 0.123079 0.123161 0.123253
F-statistic 11.76237** 10.92183** 10.91775** 10.91887**
Hausman
Model 2 (N=688) Model 2 (N=688) Model 2 (N=688)
* - - -
Model 2 (N=688)
A.12b 2SLS (Excluding Financials) Model 1
Dependent: ROA
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
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Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.236157** 0.445692 1.105020* 0.447198 1.183462** 0.442696 1.168806** 0.443949
WOMAN 0.189867 0.111263 1.416268** 0.525845 0.514359* 0.238580 0.899549* 0.365143
SIZE -0.075886** 0.026726 -0.074792** 0.024044 -0.076423** 0.025461 -0.077675** 0.024868
LEV -0.109348 0.330691 -0.074363 0.313874 -0.090144 0.321230 -0.063330 0.316323
LN_SALESG 0.208755* 0.085815 0.187876* 0.085134 0.197244* 0.084823 0.193302* 0.084552
LN_CAPEX_INT -0.022538 0.567080 -0.094211 0.583762 -0.045164 0.572494 -0.086065 0.578668
MBOARD 0.070587 0.128014 0.085531 0.122622 0.079069 0.124931 0.084593 0.123495
LN_AGECAP 0.065828 0.063126 0.037973 0.068428 0.051853 0.065820 0.045596 0.067114
PFOR 0.102812 0.111685 0.139546 0.111007 0.116860 0.111428 0.127787 0.111299
VAR_TEN 0.006300* 0.002361 0.006477** 0.002165 0.006366** 0.002278 0.006462** 0.002241
VAR_EDU 0.025249 0.017777 0.023975 0.017850 0.024764 0.017762 0.024199 0.017815
R-squared 0.128815 0.114310 0.121618 0.118114
Adjusted R-squared 0.102495 0.087552 0.095081 0.091471
S.E. of regression 0.558159 0.562787 0.560460 0.561577
F-statistic 4.741914** 5.136440** 4.893684** 5.025385**
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 2 specification on the Excluding Financials sample with LN_TQ 
as dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and 
*0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342)
A.12c 2SLS (Excluding Financials) Model 2
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Dependent: LN_TQ
- - - -
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 0.981601** 0.088800 0.995092** 0.085671 0.988872** 0.086408 0.987437** 0.086588
WOMAN -0.023915 0.021585 -0.145419 0.116028 -0.096842 0.077438 -0.056796 0.049429
SIZE 0.009146 0.005741 0.008761 0.005367 0.009124 0.005525 0.009023 0.005565
LEV -0.079204 0.053833 -0.079660 0.051423 -0.081692 0.052502 -0.079231 0.052631
LN_SALESG 0.026175 0.028671 0.028238 0.028740 0.027775 0.028655 0.027392 0.028615
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.151833 0.123311 0.158626 0.123886 0.158227 0.123661 0.153953 0.123285
MBOARD -0.112872** 0.039046 -0.113312** 0.038103 -0.113519** 0.038326 -0.113078** 0.038579
LN_AGECAP 0.010102 0.014021 0.012477 0.014508 0.011899 0.014309 0.011322 0.014183
PFOR -0.049917 0.026412 -0.054273 0.025539 -0.053065** 0.025643 -0.051858* 0.025876
VAR_TEN -3.61E-05 0.000383 -4.10E-05 0.000400 -4.31E-05 0.000394 -3.45E-05 0.000389
VAR_EDU -0.009093* 0.003705 -0.008995 0.003695 -0.009006* 0.003691 -0.009061* 0.003690
R-squared 0.137408 0.139793 0.142830 0.142607
Adjusted R-squared 0.111348 0.113805 0.116934 0.116704
S.E. of regression 0.111835 0.111680 0.111483 0.111498
F-statistic 4.763877** 4.826224** 4.812811** 4.782213**
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 2 specification on the Excluding Financials sample with ROA as 
dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342)
WTMT
Model 2 (N=342)
PWTMT BLAU TEACH
A.12d 2SLS (Excluding Financials) Model 2
Dependent: ROA
Model 2 (N=342)
- - - -
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A.13 Results 2SLS: Excluding Denmark 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent:
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std Coefficient Std
C 2.603223* 0.244684 2.562058* 0.243341 2.607051* 0.242464 2.608980* 0.242512
WTMT 0.428247* 0.117073 1.356324* 0.453796 1.201795* 0.338361 0.806507* 0.225256
SIZE -0.177612* 0.015733 -0.168456* 0.015366 -0.175319* 0.015627 -0.176154* 0.015657
LEV -0.074364 0.145649 -0.110910 0.145212 -0.095179 0.145957 -0.092544 0.145865
LN_SALESG 0.095969 0.075319 0.084424 0.075956 0.087900 0.074065 0.089775 0.074131
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.877009** 0.441016 0.808975** 0.426395 0.839041** 0.436211 0.847224** 0.437055
MBOARD 0.240434 0.182572 0.155476 0.188128 0.165600 0.190442 0.182702 0.188489
R-squared 0.162128 0.181833 0.168905 0.169858
Adjusted R-squared 0.155213 0.175080 0.162046 0.163006
S.E. of regression 0.594746 0.587711 0.592336 0.591997
F-statistic 33.86653** 32.38146** 33.41470** 33.48972**
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 1 specification on the Excluding Denmark sample with LN_TQ as 
dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
A.13a 2SLS (Excluding Denmark) Model 1
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734)
** * ** **
Independent:
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.007775* 0.054035 1.003360** 0.054264 1.004503** 0.054619 1.005361** 0.054528
WTMT 0.011622 0.018691 -0.007833 0.085391 0.004669 0.062378 0.007796 0.040264
SIZE 0.003565 0.003444 0.004448 0.003494 0.004235 0.003566 0.004076 0.003549
LEV -0.143173* 0.029689 -0.145375** 0.029230 -0.144959** 0.029390 -0.144630** 0.029452
LN_SALESG 0.057270** 0.023725 0.057071* 0.023538 0.057051* 0.023600 0.057069* 0.023636
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.163971 0.089572 0.155744 0.088084 0.157733 0.088206 0.159107 0.088477
MBOARD 0.009646 0.065347 0.009100 0.063509 0.008623 0.063993 0.008538 0.064375
R-squared 0.068658 0.080623 0.078557 0.076632
Adjusted R-squared 0.060971 0.073036 0.070953 0.069011
S.E. of regression 0.115013 0.114271 0.114400 0.114519
F-statistic 10.54679** 10.48669** 10.48608** 10.49205**
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 1 specification and the Excluding Denmark sample with ROA as 
dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
A.13b 2SLS (Excluding Denmark) Model 1
Dependent: ROA
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734)
* - - -
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Independent:
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.582481* 0.424937 1.561484** 0.423588 1.577069** 0.424053 1.579566** 0.423585
WTMT 0.278558** 0.137654 0.323020 0.687826 0.457541 0.472773 0.375439 0.304977
SIZE -0.126944* 0.027191 -0.115931** 0.026545 -0.120357** 0.027063 -0.122340** 0.027131
LEV 0.794512** 0.274277 0.656630* 0.261739 0.711288** 0.269532 0.738601** 0.272745
LN_SALESG 0.134445** 0.068596 0.126401 0.068138 0.127844 0.065775 0.129135* 0.065616
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.538585 0.504824 0.346717 0.494089 0.401628 0.496482 0.433388 0.499086
MBOARD 1.464317* 0.420565 1.437067** 0.387703 1.431594** 0.406768 1.435794** 0.413760
LN_AGECAP 0.046509* 0.013425 0.033477 0.014239 0.039141** 0.014748 0.041823** 0.014688
PFOR 0.393860* 0.116494 0.422408** 0.121734 0.430708** 0.120908 0.428062** 0.119645
VAR_TEN 0.006416* 0.001996 0.005616** 0.001908 0.005894** 0.001914 0.006043** 0.001927
VAR_EDU 0.024183 0.019037 0.031568 0.018745 0.029098 0.018989 0.027927 0.019022
R-squared 0.206850 0.239269 0.226241 0.219985
Adjusted R-squared 0.183244 0.216628 0.203213 0.196771
S.E. of regression 0.539282 0.528146 0.532649 0.534798
F-statistic 11.31976** 10.82567** 10.92217** 10.99742**
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 2 specification on the Excluding Denmark sample with LN_TQ as 
dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347)
Dependent: LN_TQ
A.13c 2SLS (Excluding Denmark) Model 2 
- - -*
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.033541** 0.069828 1.032802** 0.072059 1.029256** 0.070377 1.030609** 0.069941
WOMAN -0.011235 0.024932 -0.255753 0.145622 -0.134888 0.095444 -0.071841 0.060126
SIZE 0.003420 0.004594 0.005461 0.004808 0.005122 0.004731 0.004702 0.004696
LEV -0.076531 0.044859 -0.107883* 0.046254 -0.099584* 0.046031 -0.094074* 0.045796
LN_SALESG 0.002986 0.019400 0.003907 0.020579 0.003087 0.019659 0.002907 0.019431
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.158660 0.135747 0.118623 0.133965 0.134030 0.132859 0.140212 0.133219
MBOARD 0.019871 0.236825 0.026832 0.226556 0.024569 0.229874 0.022392 0.231861
LN_AGECAP 0.000777 0.002745 -0.002282 0.003102 -0.001581 0.003127 -0.001015 0.003076
PFOR -0.015889 0.025351 -0.028117 0.024483 -0.023239 0.024241 -0.020349 0.024279
VAR_TEN 5.20E-05 0.000337 -9.57E-05 0.000376 -5.88E-05 0.000358 -3.36E-05 0.000351
VAR_EDU -0.005944 0.004199 -0.004898 0.004087 -0.005058 0.004082 -0.005275 0.004098
R-squared 0.043041 0.029145 0.054732 0.057412
Adjusted R-squared 0.014560 0.000251 0.026599 0.029359
S.E. of regression 0.100345 0.101071 0.099730 0.099588
F-statistic 1.050240 1.469084 1.270962 1.190862
Hausman
The table shows the 2SLS regression results for the Model 2 specification on the Excluding Denmark sample with ROA as 
dependent variable. An indicator of the result of the Hausman test is included in the last row. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347)
Dependent:ROA
A.13d 2SLS (Excluding Denmark) Model 2
- - - -
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A.14 Results Pooled Regression: Full Sample 
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A.15 RE/FE test 
 
 
A.16 Results Panel Method: Best vs. Worst Sample 
 
 
 
A.15 FE/RE -test 
ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ
WTMT RE X RE X RE RE RE X
PWTMT RE X RE X RE X X X
BLAU RE X RE X RE X X X
TECH RE X RE X RE X X X
ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ ROA LN_TQ
WTMT X RE X RE X RE X RE
PWTMT X RE X RE X RE X RE
BLAU X RE X RE X RE X RE
TECH X RE X RE X RE X RE
The table shows the results of the Hausman test for Random Effects in Model 1 and Model 2, with RE indicating that the 
test pass at a 5% significance level. 
Best vs. Worst Quartiles Excluding Financials Excluding Denmark
Model 2
Model 1
Full Sample Best vs. Worst Quartiles Excluding Financials Excluding Denmark
Full Sample
A.16a CS:FE (Best vs. Worst Quartiles) Model 1 
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 0.379073 1.273481 0.343596 1.291320 0.351383 1.282808 0.358329 1.280183
WTMT -0.026157 0.071238 -0.134070 0.196544 -0.114153 0.177329 -0.071502 0.122572
SIZE -0.007610 0.080636 -0.005013 0.081965 -0.005385 0.081393 -0.005910 0.081196
LEV -0.116683 0.263751 -0.108347 0.261391 -0.106200 0.264535 -0.108619 0.264539
LN_SALESG 0.019418 0.064859 0.019775 0.065340 0.019266 0.065132 0.019270 0.065050
LN_CAPEX_INT -0.729864 0.385467 -0.742371 0.385923 -0.734486 0.383577 -0.733612 0.383891
MBOARD -0.014607 0.101776 -0.019487 0.101146 -0.019420 0.101360 -0.018281 0.101476
R-squared 0.900523 0.900605 0.900599 0.900578
Adjusted R-squared 0.849941 0.850065 0.850057 0.850025
S.E. of regression 0.248858 0.248756 0.248762 0.248789
F-statistic 17.80339** 17.81967** 17.81861** 17.81443**
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 1 specification and the Best vs. Worst Quartiles sample 
with LN_TQ as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446) 
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 1 (N=446) 
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A.16b CS:RE (Best vs. Worst Quartiles) Model 1 
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 0.974387** 0.095630 0.980455** 0.095470 0.977107** 0.095504 0.974387** 0.095630
WTMT -0.026654 0.020890 -0.063838 0.062196 -0.056480 0.049256 -0.026654 0.020890
SIZE 0.007446 0.006077 0.006858 0.005968 0.007173 0.006029 0.007446 0.006077
LEV -0.157772**0.059365 -0.157364**0.059605 -0.157423**0.059385 -0.157772**0.059365
LN_SALESG 0.068718** 0.026743 0.069105** 0.026683 0.068864** 0.026735 0.068718** 0.026743
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.176963 0.109109 0.177248 0.110657 0.177672 0.109770 0.176963 0.109109
MBOARD -0.062267 0.036443 -0.062199 0.036692 -0.062108 0.036552 -0.062267 0.036443
R-squared 0.096111 0.094401 0.095083 0.096111
Adjusted R-squared 0.083758 0.082024 0.082715 0.083758
S.E. of regression 0.104932 0.104792 0.104878 0.104932
F-statistic 7.779895** 7.627020** 7.687900** 7.779895**
The Cross Sectional Random Effects regression results for the Model 1 specification and the Best vs. Worst Quartiles 
sample with ROA as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446) 
Dependent: ROA
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 1 (N=446) Model 1 (N=446) 
A.16c CS:FE (Best vs. Worst Quartiles) Model 2
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.282309** 0.315195 1.289221** 0.313629 1.288565** 0.314705 1.282309** 0.315195
WTMT -0.100918 0.078812 -0.233728 0.200570 -0.224271 0.186998 -0.100918 0.078812
SIZE 0.001515 0.017347 0.001222 0.016665 0.001648 0.017034 0.001515 0.017347
LEV -0.212871 0.138472 -0.226897 0.140217 -0.218660 0.139134 -0.212871 0.138472
LN_SALESG 0.058690* 0.024442 0.060625* 0.025408 0.059716* 0.024912 0.058690* 0.024442
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.220515 0.192690 0.156581 0.201026 0.193997 0.194698 0.220515 0.192690
MBOARD -0.189671 0.142524 -0.203574 0.146827 -0.197333 0.144797 -0.189671 0.142524
LN_AGECAP 0.051023 0.041801 0.050724 0.041634 0.052834 0.042894 0.051023 0.041801
PFOR -0.016992 0.132168 -0.026244 0.127171 -0.020724 0.132374 -0.016992 0.132168
VAR_TEN -0.003344 0.002063 -0.003461 0.002045 -0.003425 0.002054 -0.003344 0.002063
VAR_EDU 0.012568 0.010825 0.009932 0.011427 0.011024 0.011185 0.012568 0.010825
R-squared 0.828388 0.827251 0.827662 0.828388
Adjusted R-squared 0.688432 0.686368 0.687115 0.688432
S.E. of regression 0.074902 0.075150 0.075060 0.074902
F-statistic 5.918937** 5.871909** 5.888848** 5.918937**
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 2 specification and the Best vs. Worst Quartiles sample 
with ROA as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188)
Dependent: ROA
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
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A.17 Results Panel Method: Excluding Financials 
 
 
 
 
 
A.16d CS:RE (Best vs. Worst Quartiles) Model 2
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 2.314575** 0.811974 2.334615** 0.822776 2.327616** 0.816860 2.324290** 0.815405
WOMAN -0.077506 0.116205 -0.162495 0.330877 -0.177980 0.278782 -0.125829 0.193069
SIZE -0.137470**0.049629 -0.139079**0.050308 -0.138145**0.049937 -0.137938**0.049847
LEV -0.156898 0.398402 -0.149921 0.398130 -0.155836 0.397893 -0.156468 0.397985
LN_SALESG 0.079764 0.049404 0.081630 0.048963 0.080555 0.049548 0.080307 0.049541
LN_CAPEX_INT -0.902062 0.610210 -0.917939 0.621535 -0.918988 0.611529 -0.915506 0.610566
MBOARD 0.010944 0.193470 0.005066 0.193476 0.005791 0.193358 0.006947 0.193392
LN_AGECAP 2.98E-05 0.031968 0.001872 0.031738 0.000710 0.031878 0.000481 0.031908
PFOR 0.387958 0.252361 0.391572 0.250476 0.389456 0.251781 0.389038 0.251938
VAR_TEN 0.005795* 0.002375 0.005777* 0.002403 0.005776* 0.002394 0.005780* 0.002389
VAR_EDU -0.004223 0.024376 -0.005917 0.024596 -0.005180 0.024355 -0.004927 0.024343
R-squared 0.155545 0.153368 0.154937 0.155172
Adjusted R-squared 0.107836 0.105536 0.107194 0.107441
S.E. of regression 0.249101 0.248678 0.248837 0.248908
F-statistic 3.260271** 3.206369** 3.245191** 3.251000**
The Cross Sectional Random Effects regression results for the Model 2 specification and the Best vs. Worst 
Quartiles sample with LN_TQ as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188) Model 2 (N=188) 
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
A.17a CS:FE (Excluding Financials) Model 1 
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C -0.281315 1.672740 -0.260493 1.674179 -0.239031 1.674751
WTMT 0.088874 0.195740 0.115276 0.155542 0.108317 0.106345
SIZE 0.025028 0.105045 0.023115 0.105212 0.021191 0.105269
LEV 0.025275 0.292552 0.023889 0.291407 0.021291 0.290266
LN_SALESG 0.059396 0.078966 0.059454 0.078957 0.059257 0.078973
LN_CAPEX_INT -0.013264 0.438002 -0.012757 0.436724 -0.003127 0.436932
MBOARD -0.028856 0.078258 -0.028015 0.078234 -0.027948 0.078244
R-squared 0.788710 0.788841 0.789033
Adjusted R-squared 0.731192 0.731359 0.731603
S.E. of regression 0.333978 0.333874 0.333723
F-statistic 13.71245** 13.72322** 13.73903**
Dependent: LN_TQ
PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 1 (N=688) Model 1 (N=688) Model 1 (N=688) 
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 1 specification and the 
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A.17aa CS:RE (Excluding Financials) Model 1 
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.635297** 0.599619
WTMT 0.106689* 0.046802
SIZE -0.096136**0.035956
LEV -0.112801 0.203049
LN_SALESG 0.092753 0.065704
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.108548 0.386663
MBOARD -0.015386 0.077363
R-squared 0.032968
Adjusted R-squared 0.024448
S.E. of regression 0.334925
F-statistic 3.869462**
The Cross Sectional Random Effects results 
for the Model 1 specification and the 
Excluding Financials sample with LN_TQ as 
the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and 
*0,01<p≤0,05 
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT
Model 1 (N=688)
A.17b CS:RE (Full Sample) Model 1 
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 0.928090* 0.095644 0.975834* 0.073600 0.928201* 0.095154 0.927863* 0.095087
WTMT -0.000366 0.058951 -0.010207 0.048943 -0.017869 0.042218 -0.014144 0.027476
SIZE 0.009845 0.005939 0.006499 0.004429 0.010053 0.005940 0.010125 0.005938
LEV -0.217844* 0.054852 -0.173655* 0.040766 -0.218689* 0.055128 -0.218764* 0.055002
LN_SALESG 0.069058* 0.022444 0.059780* 0.017955 0.069199* 0.022504 0.069252* 0.022516
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.194203** 0.078153 0.165394** 0.067201 0.193342 0.078263 0.192212** 0.078051
MBOARD -0.048597 0.030499 -0.042235 0.025403 -0.049371 0.030400 -0.049411 0.030315
R-squared 0.103857 0.090547 0.104150 0.104277
Adjusted R-squared 0.095961 0.084304 0.096257 0.096385
S.E. of regression 0.087998 0.082820 0.088060 0.088074
F-statistic 13.15389** 14.50290** 13.19527** 13.21326**
Dependent: ROA
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 1 (N=688) Model 1 (N=688) Model 1 (N=688) Model 1 (N=688)
The Cross Sectional Random Effects regression results for the Model 1 specification and the Excluding Financials sample 
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Independent:
Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342)
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.649619* 0.608904 1.565217** 0.615861 1.590923* 0.612703 1.601866* 0.611857
WTMT 0.107126 0.067659 0.429442 0.286457 0.342775 0.210975 0.255074 0.138951
SIZE -0.108253* 0.036478 -0.102759* 0.036192 -0.105052* 0.036196 -0.106425* 0.036110
LEV -0.302623 0.281721 -0.316698 0.284289 -0.309098 0.283037 -0.305546 0.280955
LN_SALESG 0.153626** 0.063821 0.153672** 0.064036 0.153854** 0.063711 0.152577** 0.063448
LN_CAPEX_INT -0.280847 0.524825 -0.234794 0.526814 -0.259215 0.524092 -0.246762 0.523392
MBOARD -0.078485 0.105141 -0.059362 0.107696 -0.063323 0.106690 -0.064537 0.106184
LN_AGECAP -0.051967 0.084254 -0.052169 0.083736 -0.053140 0.083488 -0.054141 0.083333
PFOR 0.318229** 0.163810 0.341593** 0.161521 0.334002** 0.161212 0.326112** 0.161750
VAR_TEN 0.008673* 0.003026 0.008596* 0.002995 0.008602* 0.003015 0.008568* 0.003004
VAR_EDU -0.011564 0.016185 -0.008370 0.016529 -0.008450 0.016434 -0.008518 0.016346
R-squared 0.107490 0.106252 0.107482 0.109748
Adjusted R-squared 0.080526 0.079250 0.080518 0.082852
S.E. of regression 0.302591 0.302955 0.302583 0.301981
F-statistic 3.986418** 3.935040** 3.986083** 4.080480**
The Cross Sectional Random Effects regression results for the Model 2 specification and the Excluding Financials sample 
with LN_TQ as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 2 (N=342)
BLAU TEACH
A.17c CS:RE (Excluding Financials) Model 2
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT PWTMT
A.17d CS:FE (Excluding Financials) Model 2
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.788795* 0.719228 1.880432* 0.725661 1.850060* 0.725900 1.839920* 0.721622
WTMT -0.011985 0.011921 0.019952 0.108958 -0.005072 0.068868 -0.007285 0.039008
SIZE -0.037329 0.045353 -0.043506 0.045830 -0.041398 0.045816 -0.040706 0.045521
LEV -0.184388* 0.084556 -0.178802* 0.083218 -0.180159* 0.083534 -0.180671* 0.083608
LN_SALESG 0.071731** 0.022907 0.072422** 0.022923 0.072151** 0.022977 0.072088** 0.022934
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.331818* 0.137306 0.340155* 0.138947 0.334649* 0.138297 0.333287* 0.137922
MBOARD -0.086697 0.050457 -0.083453 0.054224 -0.085763 0.052845 -0.086143 0.051940
LN_AGECAP 0.053046* 0.021119 0.053302* 0.021147 0.053337 0.021106 0.053332* 0.021090
PFOR 0.083764 0.075441 0.073307 0.076781 0.075707 0.076618 0.076823 0.076549
VAR_TEN -0.000228 0.001087 -0.000181 0.001093 -0.000197 0.001088 -0.000199 0.001085
VAR_EDU -0.000790 0.005451 -0.000442 0.004928 -0.000762 0.005021 -0.000838 0.005137
R-squared 0.707907 0.707459 0.707394 0.707427
Adjusted R-squared 0.595107 0.594486 0.594395 0.594442
S.E. of regression 0.075489 0.075547 0.075555 0.075551
F-statistic 6.275769** 6.262186** 6.260211** 6.261232**
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 1 specification and the Excluding Financials sample with 
LN_TQ as  the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342) Model 2 (N=342)
Dependent: ROA
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
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A.18a CS:FE (Excluding Denmark) Model 1 
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C -0.585998 1.623432 -0.639175 1.627247 -0.603987 1.628074 -0.592125 1.627912
WTMT 0.077249 0.053385 0.182190 0.177413 0.190355 0.147929 0.140482 0.102338
SIZE 0.028943 0.100375 0.033873 0.100569 0.030857 0.100701 0.029766 0.100717
LEV 0.234226 0.327618 0.232860 0.328560 0.231199 0.326930 0.230376 0.326640
LN_SALESG 0.019147 0.068468 0.018328 0.068367 0.019814 0.068229 0.019988 0.068217
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.263590 0.432224 0.240817 0.430383 0.242555 0.428360 0.249488 0.429034
MBOARD 0.063993 0.115800 0.058958 0.118070 0.059415 0.117359 0.060681 0.116959
R-squared 0.818200 0.817814 0.818028 0.818108
Adjusted R-squared 0.767841 0.767348 0.767621 0.767723
S.E. of regression 0.311782 0.312113 0.311930 0.311861
F-statistic 16.24731** 16.20517** 16.22851** 16.23723**
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 1 specification and the Excluding Denmark sample 
with LN_TQ as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734) 
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
A.18b CS:FE (Excluding Denmark) Model 1 
Independent:
NO DEN Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 0.832541* 0.391009 0.831160* 0.391993 0.827966* 0.392019
WTMT 0.047235 0.074890 0.033950 0.058906 0.019789 0.039085
SIZE 0.016599 0.024181 0.016656 0.024287 0.016891 0.024296
LEV -0.292666** 0.098018 -0.292343** 0.097837 -0.292109** 0.097828
LN_SALESG 0.059733** 0.018781 0.059822** 0.018858 0.059710** 0.018809
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.259065* 0.100941 0.257541* 0.100745 0.257603* 0.101210
MBOARD -0.062452 0.054908 -0.062410 0.054894 -0.062267 0.054845
R-squared 0.598511 0.598405 0.598272
Adjusted R-squared 0.487297 0.487162 0.486992
S.E. of regression 0.084984 0.084996 0.085010
F-statistic 5.381619** 5.379260** 5.376281**
The Cross Sectional Fixed Effects regression results for the Model 1 Specification and the 
Excluding Denmark sample with ROA as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Dependent: ROA
PWTMT BLAU TEACH
Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734) Model 1 (N=734)
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A.18bb CS:RE (Excluding Denmark) Model 1 
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error
C 0.980312** 0.077035
WTMT -0.014920 0.013714
SIZE 0.006950 0.004761
LEV -0.186133**0.045815
LN_SALESG 0.059357** 0.019187
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.212490** 0.076209
MBOARD -0.042826 0.062018
R-squared 0.095993
Adjusted R-squared 0.088532
S.E. of regression 0.085871
F-statistic 12.86622**
The Cross Sectional Random Effects 
regression results for the Model 1 
specification and the Excluding Denmark 
sample with ROA as the dependent variable. 
**p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Dependent: ROA
Model 1 (N=734) 
WTMT
A.18c CS:RE (Excluding Denmark) Model 2
Independent:
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 2.058852** 0.614373 2.015419** 0.607182 2.034978** 0.609006 2.041291** 0.609628
WOMAN 0.081493 0.065656 0.312546 0.247625 0.220876 0.189293 0.155428 0.129353
SIZE -0.136300**0.037674 -0.133507 0.037041 -0.134666**0.037170 -0.135246**0.037248
LEV 0.086722 0.256296 0.079314 0.259503 0.081003 0.258382 0.083580 0.257591
LN_SALESG 0.102775* 0.048184 0.100949* 0.047276 0.102642* 0.047416 0.102728* 0.047490
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.399240 0.531129 0.437693 0.543590 0.412467 0.538370 0.411005 0.536283
MBOARD 0.363439 0.262607 0.396189 0.250208 0.375862 0.258205 0.373615 0.259496
LN_AGECAP 0.009711 0.018077 0.008331 0.017926 0.008936 0.017924 0.009371 0.017942
PFOR 0.358844 0.184522 0.382590* 0.183180 0.378928* 0.183085 0.373978* 0.183100
VAR_TEN 0.008378* 0.002469 0.008260** 0.002412 0.008283** 0.002431 0.008304** 0.002442
VAR_EDU -0.023365 0.015670 -0.020384 0.015754 -0.021127 0.015726 -0.021439 0.015681
R-squared 0.117618 0.117330 0.116807 0.117127
Adjusted R-squared 0.091357 0.091060 0.090521 0.090851
S.E. of regression 0.278402 0.278907 0.278991 0.278837
F-statistic 4.478762** 4.466311** 4.443760** 4.457580**
The Cross Sectional Random Effects regression results for the Model 2 specification and the Excluding Denmark sample 
with LN_TQ as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347) Model 2 (N=347) 
Dependent: LN_TQ
WTMT PWTMT BLAU TEACH
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A.18d CS:FE (Excluding Denmark) Model 2
Independent
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
C 1.851936** 0.676528 1.913776** 0.678410 1.931579** 0.680970 1.916852** 0.680179
WTMT -0.004645 0.010389 0.025938 0.098762 0.026537 0.061589 0.012153 0.035637
SIZE -0.045268 0.043790 -0.049534 0.043933 -0.050715 0.044069 -0.049668 0.044006
LEV -0.201151* 0.092295 -0.200813* 0.091815 -0.200613* 0.091735 -0.200418 0.091811
LN_SALESG 0.049140* 0.019746 0.049169* 0.019800 0.049387* 0.019900 0.049370* 0.019876
LN_CAPEX_INT 0.177732 0.126417 0.188566 0.126606 0.188532 0.125379 0.185687 0.125630
MBOARD -0.265237 0.179868 -0.260909 0.183789 -0.262058 0.183172 -0.263238 0.182185
LN_AGECAP 0.001649 0.014552 0.001043 0.014152 0.001071 0.014246 0.001371 0.014327
PFOR 0.085949 0.122519 0.080258 0.122318 0.078395 0.122308 0.079055 0.122289
VAR_TEN -0.000716 0.001323 -0.000709 0.001322 -0.000709 0.001323 -0.000708 0.001323
VAR_EDU -0.001697 0.004999 -0.001310 0.004368 -0.001267 0.004557 -0.001430 0.004688
R-squared 0.661797 0.661875 0.662030 0.661848
Adjusted R-squared 0.531927 0.532035 0.532249 0.531998
S.E. of regression 0.069157 0.069149 0.069133 0.069152
F-statistic 5.095841** 5.097622** 5.101141** 5.097015**
The Cross Sectional Random Effects regression results for the Model 2 specification and the Excluding Denmark sample 
with ROA as the dependent variable. **p≤0,01 and *0,01<p≤0,05 
Dependent: ROA
TEACH
Model 2 (N=347)
WTMT
Model 2 (N=347)
PWTMT
Model 2 (N=347)
BLAU
Model 2 (N=347)
